Formen Corporation v. Mel Parks : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Formen Corporation v. Mel Parks : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson Howard, Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis and Petersen; Attorneys for Respondents.
Lowell V. Summerhays; Law Offices of Lowell V. Summerhays; Attorney for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Formen Corporation v. Mel Parks, No. 870510 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/706
BfUfc* 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
iScKBT NO. S24&&. 
DO^^^' IN
 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAljE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, 
and FRED SMITH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a 
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY 
TAYLOR, his wife, HAL PARKS, 
JERRY PARKS, STARLA PARKS (now 
STARLA MAYERS), BRYCE AVERILL, 
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA 
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS 
GENE REID, MARY REID, his wife, 
and WANDA HOPPER, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
ffssys- <f/? 
Appeal N^; 2042-6 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment oft 
Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanp 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
the 
>ete County 
Jackson Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
LAW OFFIGES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lak<3 City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for 
Defendants-Respondents 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
DEPOSITED BY THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
niici A toon 
FILED 
J U L 151985 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, 
and FRED SMITH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. Appeal No. 20426 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a 
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY 
TAYLOR, his wife, HAL PARKS, 
JERRY PARKS, STARLA PARKS (now 
STARLA MAYERS), BRYCE AVERILL, 
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA 
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS 
GENE REID, MARY REID, his wife, 
and WANDA HOPPER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Jackson Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for 
Defendants-Respondents 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this litigation are listed as follows: 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
1. Formen Corporation, a Utah corporation^ 
2. Don Skipworth, and 
3. Fred Smith, 
Defendants-Respondents 
1. Mel Parks, 
2. Parks Enterprises, Inc., an Idaho corporation, 
3. Nasky Joint Venture, a partnership, 
4. Del Taylor, 
5. Nancy Taylor, his wife, 
6. Hal Parks, 
7. Jerry Parks, 
8. Starla Parks (now Starla Ilayers) , 
9. Bryce Averill, 
10. Harry Keith Huffaker, 
11. Elza Huffaker, his wife, 
12. Thomas Gene Reid, 
13. Mary Reid, his wife, and 
14. Wanda Hopper. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF PARTIES i 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 19 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS 
ABSENT A SHOWING THAT (1) THE 
ACTION WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND (2) 
THAT IT WAS NOT BROUGHT OR ASSERTED 
IN GOOD FAITH 22 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE, WITHOUT 
HEARING ALL EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO 
MAKE FACTUAL FINDINGS 24 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND THROUGH FOURTH 
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SLANDER WITHOUT 
PRECOGNIZING THE ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED IN TRIAL AND IN PRE-TRIAL 
DISCOVERY 28 
THE LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR TO 
ORDER A DECREE OF REFORMATION 
SUCH THAT PLAINTIFFS MUST CONVEY 
WATER RIGHTS, WHERE DEFENDANTS 
CLAIM IS UNFOUNDED AND CANNOT BE 
SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTATION 33 
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CROSSCLAIMS 
OF DEFENDANTS BRYCE AVERILL, HARRY 
KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA HUFFAKER, THOMAS 
GENE REID AND MARY REID AGAINST FORMEN 
CORPORATION, FOR A REFUND OF MONIES 
ii 
PAID TO FORMEN CORPORATION, WHERE 
SUCH CLAIMS WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, IN IMPROPER 
JURISDICTION FOR THIS COURT TO RULE, 
AND WHERE THERE EXISTS GENUINE ISSUES 
OF MATERIAL FACT 37 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EVIDENTIARY 
RULINGS WHICH WERE PREJUDICIAL WHERE 
NUMEROUS OBJECTIONS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL 
WERE SUSTAINED AND LIKE OBJECTIONS BY 
PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL WERE OVERRULED; 
WHERE REVELANT TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WAS NOT ALLOWED TO 
BE HEARD; WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS 
ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AS AN ADVOCATE FOR 
THE DEFENSE POSTURE CONTRARY TO THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE CANON OF ETHICS; AND 
WHERE THE VERY NATURE AND NUMBER OF 
THESE RULINGS AND COMMENTARY OF THE 
COURT FAVORED THE DEFENSE, DEMONSTRATING 
BIAS AND PREJUDICIAL COURT RULINGS 48 
CONCLUSION 52 
TABLE OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1979) 28 
Asotin County Court District v. Clarkston 
Community Corp. , 436 PT2d 470 (Wash. 1968) 24 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 , 
89 L Ed. 2013, 65 Sup. Ct. 1416 47 
Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., v. National 
Association, Etc., 260 F.2d 803, (10th Cir. 1958) . . . 29 
Cady v. Johnson, 671, P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) 22 
California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 
fU.S. Sup. Ct.,~:972) 92 S.Ct 609, 404 U.S. 508 . . . . 45 
Campbell v. General Motors Corp. 
649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982) . . 25 
Christensen v. Stuchlik, 427 P.2d 278 (Ida. 1967) 25 
iii 
Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 
228 P.2d"272 (Ut. 1951) TT~ 30 
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) 25 
Forgett v. Shaff, 3rd Cir. Ct. of App., 
1950-1951, para. 62,000, 610, 181 F.2d 754 44 
Forgett v. Shaff, 1950, 1951 Trade Cases, 
para. 62,6T0 44 
Fredrick May & Company v. Dunn, 368 P.2d 266 
(Utah 19621 . . . 38 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) 28 
Giboney v. Empire Storage Company, 336 U.S. 
490 93 L Ed. 834, 69 Sup. Ct. 684 47 
Hales v. Commerical Bank of Spanish Fork, 
197 P.2d 910 (Utah 1948) . . . . . 7 31 
Knight v. Patterson, 436 P.2d 801, 802 (Utah 1968) . . . . 32 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) T T T " 25 
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975) . . . 28 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty, 
Ins. Co., 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965) 24 
Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) . . 30 
Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance, Co., 
582 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978) 27 
United States v. Central Code Apron and Linen Service, 
• 1952, 1953 Trade Cases 44 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 • Did the lower court err in awarding judgment against 
the Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, for attorney's fees where 
the Defendants failed to prove that the Plaintiffs1 Claim was 
"without merit" and "not brought in good faith" as was asserted 
by the Defense, and where the claims as presented by the 
Plaintiffs were of significant weight and importance having 
substantial basis in law and in fact. 
2. Did the lower Court err in granting judgment against 
the Plantiffs under rule 41 B at the conclusion of the 
Plaintiffs1 case in view of substantial evidence which was 
presented in support of Plaintiffs1 First Cause of Action -
Tortious Interference. 
3. In particular regard to the Plaintiffs1 Second, 
Third, and Fourth Causes of Action - Slander, did the lower Court 
err in granting Defendants' Motion pursuant to Rule 41(b) to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs1 action when Plaintiffs demonstrated 
sufficient evidence supported at the trial by the testimony of 
numerous witnesses so as to create factual questions based in law 
setting forth the validity and merit of Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
4. Did the lower Court err in awarding judgment on the 
Defense Counterclaim for reformation against Formen Corporation 
such that water would be provided without cost in accordance with 
the terms designated in the Judgment, when the Defendants1 claim 
was unfounded and not supported by documentation. 
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5. Did the lower Court err in granting summary judgment 
to crossclaimants Bryce Averill, Jerry Keith Huffaker, Eliza 
Huffaker, Thomas Gene Reid and Mary Reid, against Formen 
Corporation, for a refund of monies paid to Formen Corporation; 
was there error in granting summary judgment to crossclaimants 
removing Plaintiffs1 cause of action for Injunctive Relief. In 
both cases, Plaintiffs1 claims were supported with genuine issues 
of material fact presented in trial and pre-trial discovery. Was 
the granting of summary judgment inappropriate in view of the 
Statute of Limitations upon the time in which crossclaimants 
could make their complaint, and in light of the jurisdictional 
limitations of the Court. 
6. Did the lower Court err in the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs1 Fifth Cause of Action for Negligence against 
Defendant Mel Parks, and in the dismissal of Plaintiffs1 Sixth 
Cause of Action for Antitrust Violations against all Defendants 
where the rulings of the Court in pretrial discovery at 
depositions prevented Plaintiffs from obtaining relevant 
testimony to the above claims, and information important to the 
development of Plaintiffs1 case on these issues; there was 
applicable and supportive testimony presented at trial on these 
points. 
7. Did the lower Court err in making prejudicial 
Evidentiary Rulings throughout the course of this action in both 
pre-trial and trial rulings. The Court rulings appeared biased 
and prejudiced in allowing Defense objections, denying 
Plaintiffs1 objections, preventing testimony in discovery and 
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trial, and in allowing Defense Counsel to testify asserting 
personal opinions as to the justness of the Plaintiffs1 causes of 
action in violation of Rule DR 7-106, Trial Conduct, Canon 7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was originally commenced in January of 1983 
by the Plaintiffs against the Defendants claiming that the 
Defendants had conspired against and slandered the Plaintiffs to 
such an extent as to significantly prevent the Plaintiffs from 
conducting ordinary and common business, and Plaintiffs were 
damaged accordingly. Concurrently, Plaintiffs incorporated in 
their complaint a sixth cause of action against all Defendants 
for Antitrust Violations. Plaintiffs sought relief for 
wrongfully terminated contracts as a result of the tortious 
interference, slander, antitrust violations and actual damages 
for resulting sales losses plus interest loss, together with 
punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs of 
Court. 
The matter came before the Court, sitting without a 
Jury, on Monday, the 27th day of August 1984, before the 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, District Judge for Sanpete County, in the 
Courtroom of the Sanpete County Courthouse at Manti, Sanpete 
County, State of Utah. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs1 case 
Defendants moved to dismiss and the said motion was granted. 
Defense witnesses were subsequently called and examined, 
particularly in regard to Defense Counterclaims. The matter was 
submitted without argument. 
In connection with the counterclaim the Court requested 
that the parties provide to the Court the figures representing 
the balance which was due on the water contract from Formen 
Corporation to Rennert Investment Company on December 31, 1980. 
The Court ordered that both sides should submit post 
trial memorandum briefs within fifteen days to address the 
Defense damage questions as to Attorney's fees and Defendants 
claim foe water rights, whereupon the Court stood in recess, 
Friday, the 31st day of August, 1984. The Court Order was set 
forth on the 30th day of October, 1984, and the Judgment was 
entered and signed by the Court on the 11th day of December, 
1984. (Copies annexed hereto as part of the Addendum.) 
The lower Court found that the Plaintiffs1 case was 
without merit and lacking in good faith, and Defendants were 
awarded Judgment for a Decree of Reformation such that Plaintiffs 
must provide water without cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc. The 
Court also ordered Plaintiffs to pay Attorneys fees and costs 
amounting to 535,571.80. 
It is in response to the decision of the lower court 
granting Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment to Foreclosure 
Crossclaimants, and granting Defendants1 Motions to Dismiss and 
in response to the subsequent Judgment and Order that this 
present appeal is now hereby taken by Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts were established at trial and are 
not in dispute. 
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The Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into an agreement 
pursuant to which the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Parks 
developed a project in Sanpete County, Utah known as Elkridge 
Subdivision. The project was successful and the parties to that 
agreement commenced the development of a neighboring project 
referred to as Hideaway Valley. It was in connection with that 
project that disputes arose between the Plaintiffs and the Parks, 
(Hal Parks, Mel Parks, Parks Enterprises) and Del Taylor and they 
entered into a separation agreement pursuant to which executory 
contracts, water rights and property ownership was divided. 
Parks purchased a neighboring property and commenced action on it 
in the sales of lots and named it the Blackhawk Subdivision. 
A property owners association was formed to care for and 
maintain the common area in Hideaway Valley and purchasers of 
lots in Hideaway Valley began to move onto the project and 
establish cabins and homes. 
According to the Plaintiffs and the allegations set 
forth in the Complaint, the Parks, (Mel Parks, Hal Parks, Parks 
Enterprises) and Del Taylor, had various meetings with the 
remaining Defendants and according to the Plaintiffs embarked 
upon a campaign of slander during the process of which 
prospective and existing lot purchasers were contacted and 
dissuaded from purchasing lots or continuing their lot 
purchases. 
The Plaintiffs claim that the following testimony 
clearly establishes the Defendant's intent to embark upon 
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Tortious Interference and Slander; evidence of communications by 
which it was carried out and evidence of the direct damages 
caused thereby. 
Don Skipworth testified at the trial as follows: 
A And, at that time, Del Taylor and Mel Parks and Fred 
Smith was in a conversation and Fred was asking him 
also, "Couldn't we sit down and resolve our 
differences," as [sic] Taylor says, "No, we've got 
something coming for you." 
Q What did Mr. Smith say? 
A He says, "Well what are you going to do shoot me?" 
and Del Taylor says, "No, I'm not going to shoot you 
but it's a fate worse than death and you will wish you 
were dead." (Trial Transcript Page 73 Line 25 to Page 
74 Line 8) 
That statement was made in early January of 1983. 
Mel Parks and Del Taylor invited a group of lot owners 
to a meeting at their large family complex on the project on 
August 15, 1982 (Trial Transcript Page 76 Lines 1-18) 
At that meeting Don Skipworth quoted Bryce Averill as 
follows: 
A Bryce Averill made the statement that Formen 
Corporation was being cheated by Fred Smith on its 
charges to Formen Corporation and then Fred Smith and 
Max Smith cheated the people on their - - (Trial 
Transcript Page 81 Lines 16-19) 
Witness Anthony Escobar who was interested in 
purchasing a lot in the subdivision was retained by Formen 
Corporation to investigate the situation and ask questions of 
the Defendants. (Trial Transcript Pag^ 197 Line 13 through Page 
198 Line 4) 
At the time Fred Smith was a trustee of the 
association, Mr. Escobar quoted Elza Huffaker as follows: 
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A We were told that they didnft know where the 
Association funds were going and that they could not 
keep track of the funds or where they were being spent 
and so on. (Trial Transcript Page 199, Lines 15-18) 
And further as follows: 
A. Well, that Fred Smith was trying to buy up all the 
water and that nobody -- that it was difficult to get 
water and there was not enough water for cabins to be 
built on and so forth -- and that I can't -- it was a 
while ago but something to do with Clear Water, drilling 
and Clear Water and that he was getting overrides from 
Clear Water Drilling, or funds returned on Clear Water 
Development and Clear Water Drilling. (Trial Transcript 
Page 200, Lines 12-19) 
And further: 
A That the property was recreationally zoned and that 
it was difficult to get a building permit. (Trial 
Transcript Page 201 Lines 22-23). 
Mr. Escobar also spoke with Bryce Averill: 
Q What did he say? 
A That you can't believe anything that they say. 
Q That who says? 
A That Fred Smith says. 
(Trial Transcript Page 203, Line 10-14) 
When Mr. Escobar stated to Defendants Bryce Averill and 
Gene Reid that he was thinking of buying a lot, they made the 
following statement: 
A Bryce Averill and Gene Ried said, "You don't want to 
buy a lot until you find out exactly what you're getting 
into," and Gene Reid indicated the same thing and 
comments came from all parties to that respect. (Trial 
Transcript Page 204, Lines 5-8) 
Bryce Averill further stated: 
A He indicated that I couldn't -- that I could only 
bring in one stick at a time because I can't have any 
lumber sitting on the property and that they would make 
it difficult for me to build. (Trial Transcript, Page 
204, Lines 20-23) 
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The testimony of Mr. J. Fred Smith demonstrated 
Plaintiff's case for tortious interference and slander. He 
testified that during the spring of 1982 he was informed by Mel 
Parks that Mr. Parks had purchased the balance of the Black 
Hawk Project and that "because he was cheated on the Hideaway 
Valley Project that he was going to put us out of Business." 
(Trial Transcript Page 247, Lines 1-11) Mr. Smith went on to 
explain that he remembered those words "Put us out of business" 
exactly, and he was "shocked" because at that point he never 
even knew there was a problem. (Trial Transcript Page 247, Lines 
15-20) 
In response to numerous phone calls as a result of the 
"More Fireworks" letter, Mr. Smith testified that he expressed 
concern to Mel Parks "that what he was spreading around the 
country was going to do us some irreparable harm." 
Q Now, precisely what did you say to express that 
concern? 
A I said that we were having some people terminate 
their contracts because of what he was allegating and 
talking about that we were crooks, cheats, and liars 
around the subdivision and to the county officials and 
we were losing customers and it was costing us some 
money and I insisted that he stop it. (Trial 
Transcript Page 262, Lines 9-25) 
The harm done to Formen Corporation resulted in a new 
category for defining contract cancellations: 
Q And what are some of those categories that you fit 
those cancellations into? 
A Sickness, unemployment, lack of interest, and then 
recently the crooks, cheats and liars comments that the 
Parks were involved with. (Trial Transcript Page 286, 
Lines 1-5) 
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Mr. Smith testified that in April of 1981 Mel Parks 
said he could do business with him but that "Ted Bradford and 
Don Skipworth were crooks, he couldn't stand them and he just 
wouldnft do business with them and that he was going to get them 
if he could11. 
Fred Smith summarized the malicious threats and intent 
of Defendant Del Taylor in his testimony as follows: 
A Del Taylor said, "Your problems are just beginning." 
I says, "Well, the worst you can do is shoot me and 
then I'd be out of all the misery", and he says, "We 
have" - - Del Taylor says, "We have a fate worse than 
death in store for you", and I asked him what that 
could possibly be and he left without answering it. 
(Trial Transcript Page 306, Lines 10-15) 
Witness Louis K. Sharp testified that Del Taylor had 
advised him not to pay his Property Owner's Association dues 
because Fred Smith was undenaining the Association and misusing 
the Association's funds. (Trial Transcript Page 313, Lines 2-6) 
As requested, Mr. Sharp did not pay his dues. He said that he 
"was getting fairly disgusted with the situation of being felt 
like I was being caught in the middle of something I wanted no 
part of." 
Mr. Sharp is no longer an owner in that project 
"Because I got tired of paying for a dead horse." 
0 Now, when you say "a dead horse" what do you mean? 
A I mean that the property was virtually worthless. 
Q And why was it worthless? 
A Because I could not sell it. 
Q Do you know why you couldn't sell it? 
A Because of the rumors, several rumors, that were 
floating around. (Trial Transcript Page 314, Lines 3-
13) 
This single cancellation represented a net loss to 
Forraen Corporation, present and future, of $10,824.40 as 
demonstrated in the testimony of Donald Ray Skipworth. (Trial 
Transcript Page 558, Line 6) 
Witness Gary Christiansen testified that he was 
thinking of buying a lot in the Plaintiffs1 project and that he 
spoke to Defendant Bryce Averill and told him that. (Trial 
Transcript Page 514, Lines 7-11) Whereupon Defendant Bruce 
Averill said: 
To the best of my recollection was that Fred Smith was a 
liar and never kept his promise, you could never get a 
land deed, and you could never get any water rights from 
him and about that time I got a little mad and I didn't 
say anything but I paid for our breakfast and left to 
finish my job and I drove to Fred's property. (Trial 
Transcript Pge 514, Lines 15-20) 
Mr. Christiansen decided not to buy a lot. (Trial 
Transcript page 515, Lines 5-15) 
Witness Brad Craig testified that Mrs. Gene Reid 
(Defendant Mary Reid) told him the Plaintiffs couldn't deliver 
water rights they had purportedly sold to Mr. Craig. 
Q What did you say and what did Mrs. Reid say on that 
occasion? 
A Well, the occasion started when we were talking 
about our lots and they were next to each other, and I 
had purchased some water rights. They told me they had 
no right to sell any water rights because Formen 
Corporation did not have any water rights to sell me. 
Q Who said that? 
A Mrs. Gene Reid. 
(Trial Transcript page 528, Line 22 to Page 529, Line 
10) 
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Further: 
A Mrs. Gene Reid said that Fred and Max Smith were 
liars and cheats and that anything they did for the 
subdivision that they were pocketing the money. . (Trial 
Transcript Page 529, Lines 18-20) 
Witness Craig further testified: 
Q What did you say and what did Mr. Averill say? 
A Well, we were talking about the lots and what was 
going on up there and he told me that Formen 
Corporation was nothing but a scam to get people's money 
and that their main objective was to foreclose as soon 
as they had possible time to do and they were liars and 
cheats, (Trial Transcript Page 530, Lines 7-14) 
Further: 
Q Did Mr. Averill ever mention anything to you about 
the deed to your land? 
A Yes, he did. He also said that I couldn't get a 
deed to my land even if I did pay for it. (Trial 
Transcript Page 530 Lines 18-23) 
Frank Pino, a lot owner in Hideaway Valley, testified 
that Defendant Del Taylor (at a meeting also attended by 
Defendant Mel Parks and Mr. Taylor's father-in-law) told him 
that Plaintiff Fred Smith was wrongfully taking money from the 
homeowners association. He testified as follows: 
Q What did Mr. Taylor say on that occasion? 
A Well, not to pay my assessments and that Fred Smith 
was high on his prices and on his equipment. 
Q Was the subject o*r vhat would happen on the 
assessment money discussed? 
A Yes. They said Formen Corporation and Fred Smith was 
taking all the money and not to do anything. (Trial 
Transcript Page 544, Line 2 3 to Page 545, Line 4) 
Witness Pat Ilounteer testified that she terminated her 
lot purchase because of all the problems that existed at the 
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subdivision and specifically that she, as the secretary for the 
association, was not able to participate in meetings as of 
interference at at least one meeting from Del Taylor, (Trial 
Transcript Page 441, Line 23 through Page 442, Line 6) 
Witness Leslie Wallace Roach testified that as a result 
of receiving Exhibit 35 in the mail, and similar correspondence, 
that he terminated his contract. (Exhibit 35 is attached to 
this brief as an exhibit. This was a letter composed and sent 
by the Defendants.) (Trial Transcript Page 434, Line 6 through 
Page 435, Line 14) 
Witness LaMar Macklin stated that he resigned from his 
position as trustee of the Property Owners Association as a 
result of derogatory comments about Formen Corporation made by 
Mr. Taylor at the Property Owners Association meeting, (Trial 
Transcript Page 500, Line 25 through Page 501, Line 12) 
Certified Public Accountant Frank Stuart testifed 
regarding damages and introduced Exhibit 46 which was admitted 
into evidence. 
The Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that the 
slander and tortious interference commenced in May of 1982. The 
Court restrained the Defendants from slandering the Plaintiffs 
on February 2, 1983. 
Exhibit 46 shows that sales for the Plaintiff Formen 
Corporation were 215 lots for 1981 with 33 cancellations. 
Exhibit 46 shows that sales for 1982 were 95 with 68 
cancellations. Exhibit 46 shows monthly sales during this 
relevant period as follows: 
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1982 
January-
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
3 
2 
5 
12 
11 
18 
4 
9 
11 
6 
8 
6 
(Alleged Inception 
of slander and 
tortious interference 
1983 
8 
Injunction 
16 
24 
11 
From the foregoing it can be seen that sales fell off 
shortly after the alleged inception and increased immediately 
after the injuction. 
Mr. Stuart using the 1981, 1982 and 1983 figures 
testified that in his opinion the Plaintiffs were damaged in the 
amount of $3,600,000.00 (Trial Transcript, Page 401, Lines 1-5) 
The rulings of the Court can best be demonstrated in 
fact by the actual record of the Transcript of Preceedings of 
Trial wherein Plaintiffs were prevented from questioning 
witnesses as to relevant information in support of their 
concerns. 
As to speculative testimony, Plaintiffs1 Counsel 
objected to Defense questioning, Tr. Vol. I, page 114; 
Objection Overruled. 
As to the assumption of facts not in evidence, 
Plaintiffs' Counsel objected to Defense questioning, Tr. Vol. I, 
Page 145; Objection Overruled. 
As to Plaintiffs1 Objection to Defense Questioning, 
regarding the assumption of a fact belied by all of the evidence, 
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Tr. Vol. I, page 179; Objection Overruled. 
As to Plaintiffs1 Objection to Belaboring Questioning, 
Tr. Vol. I, page 184; Objection Overruled. 
There is a question as to whether the lower Court had 
already made up its mind in this matter prior to hearing the 
evidence. Regarding a question of reading language which could 
possibly be construed to be slanderous, the Court said: 
Just jump over the language and let the Supreme Court 
read it if they want to. 
Tr. Vol. I, page 233, lines 9 and 10. 
Plaintiffs1 Objection to irrelevent information was 
overruled, Tr. Vol 1. page 233, lines 15 through 19. 
As to Defense Objections as to Plaintiffs1 questioning 
regarding applications on file with the Court, Defense 
objections were Sustained and Plaintiffs1 witness was unable to 
testify as to any implications of the application, Tr. Vol II, 
pages 245 and 246. 
The Defense motion to strike relevant commentary in 
response to Plaintiffs1 questioning regarding title report and 
title opinion claims was sustained and the answer remains barred 
from the record, Tr. Vol II., pages 253, 254. 
The next few questions were also objected to by Defense 
Counsel, and sustained by the lower Court. The following 
discussion occurred: 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, for the record, we would 
profer an additional line of questions on the same 
subject and I assume that the objections would be 
similar and you would rule the same way. 
THE COURT: Don't assume anything, Counsel. I don't 
want you assuming anything. You try the case like you 
feel and I111 rule like I feel I should rule and then, 
if somebody's made a mistake, it will be on the record. 
Tr. Vol. II, page 254, lines 17 through 24. 
Defense Objection was sustained upon testimony vital to 
Plaintiffs1 case. Plaintiffs1 counsel explained as follows: 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, this is a critical 
evidentiary issue in our case and Mr. Smith, as the 
President of the company, is entitled to testify 
regarding general business conditions that affect his 
company. Now, you know, we've had numerous 
communications with people complaining that so-and-so 
said so-and-so and I do have a hearsay problem, but we 
think clearly that Mr. Smith is entitled, if he gets a 
barrage of telephone calls and arguments to merely 
reflect the condition that existed in his business as a 
result of the statement by the Defendants... (Tr. Vol. 
II. page 257, lines 14-24) 
The discussion continued, culminating with: 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We have the burden to summarize the 
business conditions for Formen. We are having a number 
of witnesses come in and I think we will burden the 
Court even with the number we have but on each episode 
they stirred up tremendous impact on the business, 
tremendous numbers of communications. We can't bring in 
hundreds and hundreds of people to describe all of 
that. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained, Counsel. 
Another such instance occurred Tr. Vol. II, page 269, 
page 270, where Defendants Objected to critical information 
perceived by Plaintiffs to be relevant and not hearsay. The Court 
said "I don't see how it's relevant. Maybe I'm mistaken." 
Plaintiffs' counsel explained that it is necessary to lay a 
foundation to show what business events occurred during the 
episode of slander. Nevertheless, the Court Sustained Defense 
Objection that "it's immaterial, irrelevant and hearsay". 
Plaintiffs' counsel asked (Tr. Vol. II, page 283, lines 
4 and 5) "how many projects have you developed as of that point?" 
Objection by Defense was sustained. Plaintiffs1 counsel asked 
next (Tr. Vol II, page 183, lines 13 and 14) "do you have an 
opinion, Mr. Smith, as to why your sales were down in '82?" This 
objection was also sustained. 
From this point on there were repeated Objections to 
Plaintiffs1 questioning which were likewise Sustained. 
Objection was made and sustained as to Plantiffs 
questioning sales levels following the appropriate foundational 
questioning. See Tr. Vol. I, pages 288 through 289, which reads 
as follows: 
Q Now, you normally have high sales. Do you know or 
can you give us any reason to explain why your sales 
plummented in July of 1982, and continued low throughout 
that summer? 
A. Yes. 
MR. HOWARD: Objection, no foundation laid. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Well, it's right there, Your Honor, in 
front of us. 
THE COURT: The objection's sustained. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: May I get the grounds for the Court1s 
ruling? 
THE COURT: I don't think there's any foundation for it, 
Counsel. I think it becomes just so remote. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: That he can't explain why he thinks his 
sales went down? 
THE COURT: Well, I think he's got to have a basis. I 
don't think he can come up with an assumption because of 
the graph that he had run out on the computer. 
Plaintiffs were unable to present testimony and to have 
pertinent exhibits accepted by the lower Court. Objections 
followed the entire line of questioning which was necessary to 
lay foundation, and to demonstrate the very concerns raised which 
eventually necessitated the initiation of this litigation. 
Similar rulings and courtroom misunderstandings will be found in 
Tr. Vol. II. pages 294, 295, 297, 298, and 299. 
The extent of the Defense barrage of objections is 
exemplified as follows: 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, Ifm going to object to the 
conversation regarding rumors. It may very well be that 
rumors were floating around but that doesnft --
MR. SUMMERHAYS: He hasn't said anything about i 
conversation. 
MR. HOWARD: I just want to make my objection in 
advance. 
Tr. Vol. II, page 314, lines 14 through 20. 
The same grounds upon which the Court sustained Defense 
objections to questioning regarding documents as to the best 
evidence, are the grounds upon which the Court overruled 
Plaintiffs1 objections for the same reason. (Tr. Vol. II, page 
323) 
Another example of court bias in rulings is demonstrated 
in Tr. Vol II, page 325, lines 16 through 19: 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We'll object, Your Honor, it's 
repetitious and it's also immaterial; that's immaterial 
here on that line of questioning. 
THE COURT: The objection's overruled. 
Similar examples followed in Tr. Vol. II, pages 331, 
333, 338, and 355. 
Defense objections were sustained as to the line of 
questioning setting forth damage cases to be relied upon in 
support of the economist's testimony as to Plaintiffs' damages. 
(Tr. Vol. II, page 386, lines 2 through 10.) 
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In Tr. Vol. II, pages 469 through 479 the line of 
questioning from Plaintiffs1 counsel to Mr. Ross Blackham, 
Sanpete County Attorney, was objected to by Defense counsel and 
sustained by the Court. The objection was that it was irrelevant 
and immaterial testimony. Plaintiffs1 counsel endeavored to 
explain the very important relevance of this testimony to the 
Court. It was critical to Plaintiffs1 response to Defense 
Counter-claim to show that Plaintiffs1 actions were within the 
boundaries of law and order. Defendants had alledged that 
Plaintiffs had improperly developed and sold unregistered 
property in violation of the zoning ordinance, which is a 
criminal offense. To accuse someone of a criminal action where 
there was no criminal activity is to Slander someone. Plaintiffs 
were in this instance not allowed to present relevant testimony 
as to the legality of their actions. This Court ruling may have 
been predicated upon pre-existing bias as reflected in Tr. Vol. 
II, page 479, lines 13 through 22 which went as follows: 
THE COURT: I love you, Mr. Blackham, but I just don't 
care what you think. 
A Thank you. 
(Witness Excused). 
THE COURT: And I can tell you that Mr. Blackham doesn't 
care what I think most of the time. 
Now, have you decided whether you want to call him or 
not? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: I don't want to call him, Your Honor. 
In Tr. Vol. Ill, page 518 through 522, Plantiffs1 
counsel was not allowed to ask questions demonstrating the impact 
in the community of the effect of the slander which is one of the 
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elements Plaintiffs need to show in a Slander case. On page 523 
Defense Objections were Sustained such that Plaintiffs1 counsel 
could not ask questions regarding water title* On page 524 
Defense Objection was Sustained as to questioning regarding bad 
feelings. On page 534 Plaintiffs1 objections were overruled as 
to Defense counsel suggestions to the witness and as to 
repetitious and harassing questioning. 
It is clear that the weight of the Court's pr*judicial 
evidentiary rulings, as demonstrated in the above facts, favored 
the Defendants by the very nature of the rulings barring 
Plaintiff's case presentation. The transcript of the pre-trial 
deposition of Mel Parks, taken before the Court, will reveal many 
additional such ruling indicative of a predisposition and 
prejudice on the part of the Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court erred in awarding Attorney's Fees, 
office and court costs totalling $35,571.80 to the Defense where 
Defendants failed to prove bad faith on the part of the 
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs instituted the proceedings in this matter 
with good faith, and with the belief that they were damaged by 
the wrongdoings of the Defendants. From the time of the 
initiation of this suit, through discovery and through the trial, 
Plaintiffs have contended that they were wronged by the 
Defendants, and in good faith, they attempted to prove their 
damages. Plaintiffs have spent a good deal of time, effort and 
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money in the furtherance of their cause, and would not have done 
so if it were not with the belief that they were entitled to the 
relief sought in their pleadings. 
The lower court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs1 causes 
of action for Tortious Interference and for Slander since the 
court mistakenly concluded, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs 
had failed to prove a prima facia case either on liability or on 
damages, that Plaintiffs had not proven any tortious interference 
from the evidence the Court heard, that Plaintiffs had not proven 
any slander, malice, or falsity, and that Plaintiffs1 damages 
were so general and speculative as to not be worthy of 
consideration. 
The lower court erred in awarding judgment to Defendants 
for reformation of the "Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution 
Agreement11 which agreement was previously entered into on the 
31st day of December, 1980, and which agreement was properly 
executed and attested to by parties of both parts, which 
agreement speaks for itself and was established well prior to the 
initiation of this litigation, and which agreement is in and of 
itself a document setting forth the contractual rights and 
understandings of both parties for the very purpose of defining 
rights so as to prevent this type of misunderstanding. 
The above matters are questions of fact and of law which 
were supported in evidence, much of which was not allowed to be 
heard at the trial. Further, the Court seemed to have held 
written contractual agreements as inconsequential as to assumed 
understandings of what ought to be. 
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The lower Court improperly granted Summary Judgment to 
crossclaimiant, foreclosure Defendants where genuine issues of 
material fact should have been tried rather than ruled on in a 
motion, and where there are factual questions as to the Court's 
jurisdiction and as to Defendants1 violations of the Statute of 
Limitations. 
The extent to which the Court did not hear supportive 
evidence was largely due to the Court's evidentiary rulings 
preventing Plaintiffs1 case from being heard. Initially the 
lower Court, in presiding for the taking of the deposition of Mel 
Parks, prevented testimony by sustaining Defense objections such 
that Plaintiffs were unable to develop the facts in support of 
their claims for negligence against Defendant Mel Parks; and 
concurrently Plaintiffs were prevented from obtaining testimony 
corroborating their case of Antiturst Violations. Nevertheless, 
there are substantial facts presented for review in this appelant 
brief to show cause why Plaintiffs complaint for Antiturst 
Violations should have been heard at the trial. 
The lower Court was incorrect to have erroneously 
excluded testimony upon relevant questioning which was repeatedly 
objected to by Defense Counsel, and repeatedly sustained by the 
Court. Similar objections by Plaintiffs1 Counsel were frequently 
overruled. The rulings of the lower court were predictably 
consistent and served to preclude Plaintiffs case from being 
heard while admitting Defense testimony notwithstanding 
Plaintiffs objections and rights. Further, the lower Court 
allowed Defense Counsel to render prsonal opinion in trial 
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testimony as the merit and intent of Plaintiff's Complaint in 
violation of the Canon of Ethics. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE DEFENDANT 
ABSENT A SHOWING THAT (1) THE 
ACTION WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND (2) 
THAT IT WAS NOT BROUGHT OR ASSERTED 
IN GOOD FAITH. 
This Court has recently interpreted UCA 78-27-56 in an 
opinion by Justice Howe, Cady v. Johnson, 671 P2d. 149 (Utah 
1983). The Court stated at page 151: 
This statute is narrowly drawn. It was not meant to be 
applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits. 
To safeguard against too broad an application, two 
elements are required in addition to being prevailing 
party. First, the claim must be "without merit.". . * 
In addition to finding the claim to lack merit, the 
trial court must also find that plaintiffs1 conduct in 
bringing suit was lacking in good faith. 
The Court stated at page 151 that the term without merit 
implies boardering on frivolity and this meant "of little weight 
or importance having no basis in law or fact." 
The "factual posture of the record shows that there is 
ample and substantial basis in law and in fact to support the 
proposition that Plaintiffs claim were not without merit. The 
discussions found under the topic of tortious interference and 
slander fully demonstrated this. 
The facts set forth, supra, prove the following 
propositions: 
1. That the Defendants expressed an intent to damage 
the Plaintiffs. 
2. That the Defendants made numerous statements to 
third persons to the effect that Plaintiffs were crooks, cheats 
and liars. 
3. That the Defendants tried to take Plaintiffs' 
customers, 
4. That the Defendants contacted numerous regulatory 
and governmental bodies seeking sanctions against Plaintiffs, 
all of the which were found to be without merit as no sanctions 
were sought or enforced. 
5. That Plaintiffs sales substantially decreased 
commencing at a time when the slander started and substantially 
increased immediately after the issuance of the injunction. 
Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the 
Plaintiffs case was without basis in law or tact. 
In Cady, this court adopted the Warlington definition of 
good faith as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activites 
in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge 
of the fact that the activites in question will, [sic] 
hinder, delay or defraud others. 
This court held in Cady, that an award of attorneys fees 
against Plaintiff under the foregoing definition was improper. 
Justice Howe stated at page 152: 
In the instant case, the trial court found lack of good 
faith because had plaintiffs researched the issue as 
instructed at pretrial conference, they would have 
discovered they had not vaild claim and they could have 
saved the court valuable time by avoiding trial. 
We disagree that their conduct constitutes bad faith. 
Plaintiffs were clearly pursuing a meritless claim and 
better preparation might well have disclosed that to 
them. However, that conduct does not rise to lack of 
-23-
good faith. The evidence must also affirmatively 
establish a lack of at least one of the three elements 
of good faith heretofore discussed. 
In this case Plaintiffs-Appellants have a much stronger 
case than the Plaintiffs did in Cady and there is no evidence 
whatsoever to affirmatively establish a lack of at least one of 
the three elements of the Cady definition. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE, WITHOUT 
HEARING ALL EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO 
MAKE FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
The lower court dismissed Plaintiffs1 case at the 
conclusion of its evidence. It is fundamental that before a 
dismissal should be ordered the lower court must consider the 
contentions of Plaintiffs in a light most favorable to them and 
should resolve any doubts as to that right of recovery by 
permitting full trial. Reliable Furniture Co. v Fidelity & 
Guaranty Ins. Co., 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965). Amotion to dismiss 
for insufficiency of evidence which is made at the close of 
Plaintiffs case admits the truth of evidence and all reasonable 
inferences arising therefrom and the court must consider such 
evidence most strongly in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
defendant. Asotin County Court District v Clarkston Community 
Corp., 436 P.2d 47G (Wash. 1968). 
A dismissal on a motion at the conclusion of Plaintiffs1 
case is indistinguishable in operation and effect from a motion 
for a directed verdict where a jury is present. Christensen v 
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Stuchlik, 427 P.2d 278 (Ida 1967). This Court has on many 
occasions stated that in reviewing a motion for a directed 
verdict the trial court may not waive the evidence but must 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is directed. Cruz v Montoya, 660 P.2d 
723 (Utah 1983). 
In determining whether Plaintiff's evidence is 
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, a trial court may 
not weigh the evidence or consider credibility of witnesses but 
the evidence most favorable to the Plaintiff must be accepted as 
true and conflicting evidence must be completely disregarded. 
Campbell v General Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982). 
Applying these basic fundamental rules of review shows 
that the lower Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' case. The 
testimony introduced by Plaintiffs for their first cause of 
action, Tortious Interference, was in total compliance with the 
guidelines set forth in the Utah Supreme Court case of Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co., v Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Ut. 1982), 
whereby the Utah Supreme court recognized a common law cause of 
action for "intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations". In that case, the court indicated that a prima facia 
cause of action for tortious interference would lie if the 
Plaintiff could show ,f(1) that the Defendant intentionally 
interfered with the Plaintiff's existing or potential economic 
relations; (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means; (3) 
causing injury to the Plaintiff." All of these points were 
demonstrated by the Plaintiffs in trial as evidenced on the 
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record of the transcript of proceedings in the lower Court and 
are set forth within this appellant brief by the nature of the 
Statement of the Facts. 
In the Leigh Funiture case, the court elaborated on the 
subject of improper means. In its discussion of improper 
purpose it noted that: 
...[i]n the rough and tumble of the marketplace, 
competitors inevitably damage one another in the stuggle 
for personal advantage. The laws offer no remedy for 
those damages even if they are intentional—because 
they are an inevitable byproduct of competition. 
Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose make 
it prudent for commerical conduct to be regulated for 
the most part, by the improper means alternative, which 
typically requires only a showing of particular 
conduct. 
The alternative or improper purpose will be 
satisfied where it can be shown that the actor's 
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff. 
Leigh Furniture 657 P.2d at 307. 
The subjective intent of a person is difficult to 
discern and even more difficult to prove. Still in this case, 
there is ample evidence that the Defendants intended to damage 
the Plaintiffs1 business relations for the sole purpose of doing 
harm and injury to the Plaintiffs and not out of an intent to 
obtain competitive advantage in business affairs. 
Some of the acts of the Defendants showing their Tialice, 
ill will, and improper purpose toward the Plantiffs are set 
forth in this appellant brief Statements of Facts Section. 
Even if it cannot be proved that the Defendants1 
purpose was to harm and injure the Plaintiff rather than to 
obtain a competitive business advantage, the Plaintiffs may 
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still recover by showing that the Defendants used improper means 
to interfere with the Plaintiffs1 business relations: 
The alternative requirement of improper means is 
satisfied where the means used to interfere with a 
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as 
violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized 
common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in 
themselves and hence interference, 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P2d at 308 (Citations omitted)• The court 
went on to give some specific examples of things that would be 
considered "improper" and said, quoting Top Service Body Shop, 
Inc., vs. Allstate Insurance Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978), 
"Commonly included among improper means are violence, threats or 
other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, briber, 
unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood." 
Leigh Funriture, 657 P.2d at 308 (Emphasis added). 
There is ample evidence demonstrated in the Statement of 
Facts to support a finding by the trier of fact that the improper 
means employed by the Defendants included threats or other 
intimidation, misrepresentation, defamation and disparaging 
falsehood. It is therefore clear that the second requirement of 
a cause of action for tortious interference is shown, if not by 
the Defendants1 malice as improper purpose, at least by the 
Defendants1 use of improper means. 
The Plaintiffs have suffered damage which is unequivical 
and supported by substantial documentary evidence (see Statement 
of Facts). Certainly, there is no question that the Plaintiffs 
can show that they have been damaged by the Defendant. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND THROUGH FOURTH 
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SLANDER WITHOUT 
RECOGNIZING THE ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED IN TRIAL AND IN PRE-TRIAL 
DISCOVERY. 
Utah recognizes slander per se where the Defendant 
defames an individual using words that, among other things, 
charge "criminal conduct" or charge "conduct that is incompatible 
with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or 
office." Allred vs. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 320 (Ut. 1979). When 
slander per se is established, harm is presumed. Prince vs. 
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Ut. 1975). While some states have 
adopted the negligence standard established in Gertz vs. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) in all cases, Utah has never 
abandoned the common-law application of strict liability for 
defamation in a case involving a non-media Defendant and a 
private Plaintiff. There is no requirement of showing malice or 
that the Defendant's intended to defame the Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover proved damages upon showing 
that the Defendants libeled them and that the Plaintiffs suffered 
an injury thereby. General or presumed damages and punitive 
damages may be recovered by the Plaintiff by showing actual 
malice on the part of the Defendant. Allred, 590 P. 2d at 322, 
323. 
The case at hand clearly falls under the rubric of 
slander per se. In the case of Prince vs. Peterson, 538 P.2d 
1325 (Ut. 1975), the Plaintiff was attempting to sell his 
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business when he discovered that the Defendant was telling 
prospective buyers and others that the Plaintiff was crooked and 
dishonest in his business dealings and was cheating his owT 
children. In a letter to a prospective buyer of the Plaintiffs1 
business, the Defendant called the Plaintiff a "clever crook" and 
"If words of that character are used in such a context 
or under such circumstances, they would reasonably be 
understood to come within the traditional requirement of 
libel or slander: that is, to hold a person up to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injur him in his 
business or vocation, they are deemed actionable per se; 
and the law presumes that damages will be suffered 
therefrom." Prince, 528 P.2d at 1328. 
In the present case, the Defendants have called the 
Plaintiffs "crooks, cheats and liars" and have opened them up to 
hatred, contempt and ridicule in a way that has injured the 
Plaintiffs in their business and vocations. (See Statement of 
Facts. 
All of these statements are actionable in and of 
themselves, nothing else needs to be shown except that these 
words were spoken and the Plaintiffs suffered an injury as a 
result of them. If there is any question as to whether or not 
these statements are defamtory, the Plaintiff is entitled to have 
a jury decide: 
Only when the Court can say that the language is not 
reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot 
be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense, that 
the Court can rule as a matter of law that it is not 
defamatory." Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., vs. National 
Association, Etcl, 260 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1958). 
Clearly, however, the evidence goes beyond the bare 
minimum requirements for actionable slander. There is no more 
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than sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could find 
that the statements were motivated by malice and ill will, as 
such the Plaintiffs are entitled to general damages and puntive 
damages. 
The Defendants claim that there is a privilege based on 
the First Amendment to make defamatory statements to public 
officials and cite Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934 (N.D. 
Cal. 1972) as authority for this proposition. The Sierra Club 
case is inapposite. The holding in that case was simply that a 
Plaintiff injured by a change in the government's policy effected 
by legitimate efforts on the part of the Defendant could not 
maintain an action for damages resulting from that change in 
policy. This is nothing in the Sierra Club case which indicates 
that the Defendants defamed the Plaintiff and were not held 
liable for that defamation. The privilege of petitioning the 
government for redress does not carry with it the unfettered 
right to make false and damaging statements about a private 
party. To follow the Defendant's argument to its logical 
extreme would allow a person to use government channels to 
malign and injure a fellow citizen by falsehood and slander with 
absolute impunity. The Defendant's agrument suggests that the 
libel and slander are permissible if the recipient is government 
official. 
The Defendants also claim that their statements were 
conditionally privileged because they shared a common interest 
with the buyers and prospective buyers. The case of Combes v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Ut. 1951) explains Utah's 
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doctrine of conditional privilege. In that case the Utah 
Supreme Court cited with approval the of Hales v. Commerical 
Bank of Spanish Fork, 197 P2d 910 (Ut. 1948) which adopted the 
Restatement of Torts Sec. 594: 
An occasion is conditionally privileged when the 
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief 
that (a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently 
important interest of the publisher, and (b) the 
recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be 
of service in the lawful protection of the interest. 
The Court went on to explain that the requirement was "for the 
purpose of safeguarding against too wide-spread, careless or ill-
advised inquiry under the protection of the cloak of conditional 
privilege...11 Combes, 228 P.2d at 275. 
So something more than good faith and an interest in 
common with the other is required for a conditional privilege to 
attach. It is required that the publisher have a protectable 
interest and that the recipient be able, somehow, to aid in 
protecting that interest. In order for the Defendant to claim 
conditional privilege they must show that they had an interest in 
the matter which they correctly or reasonably believed could be 
protected by their publication of the defamatory matter. The 
Defendants have failed to show any such relationship with those 
to whom they published the defamatory statements. 
While at first glance it may appear that the meeting of 
the owner's association of the Hideaway properties falls under 
the conditional privilege, in fact, those who were actively 
telling the other owners untruths such as that Forraen Corporation 
and Fred Smith were unable to convey title or obtain a well 
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permit did not have an interest that could be protected by the 
publication of defamatory matter. Some of those parties such as 
Del Taylor and Mel parks had already received their deeds and 
obtained their well permits. As such, they had no interest 
sufficiently important to them to publish defamatory materials. 
Furthermore, the statements made at the meetings were 
not made only to proper persons. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Knight v. Patterson, 436 P.2d 801, 802 (Ut. 1968), quoting 33 
Am.Jur. 126 explained the doctrine of conditional privilege as 
follows: 
The essential elements of a conditionally privileged 
communication may accordingly be enumerated as good 
faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in 
its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and 
publication to proper parties only. 
Knight, 436 P.2d at 802 (Emphasis added). At these meetings were 
Arlon Fox, Jim Norlander and numerous others, non-owners who 
could in no way help the Defendant's maintain any purported 
interest. As such they were improper parties to receive 
defamatory matter under a conditional privilege. 
Even if we assume, inspite of the above, that the 
statements made at the owner's association meetings were 
conditionally privileged, that would not make other defamatory 
statements not made at those meetings conditionally privileged. 
Most of the defamatory statements were made at other than 
association meetings. 
Even if the Defendants could remedy this situation and 
somehow show that they were conditionally privileged in making 
the defamatory statements, that privilege requires that the 
-32-
publication be made in good faith and only to the extent 
necessary. See Knight v. Patterson, 436 P.2d at 802. As already 
mentioned there is more than enough evidence on which a trier of 
fact could find that the Defendant's acts were motivated by 
malice and ill-will. "It is sufficient to say that qualified 
privilege is inconsistent with the existence of express or 
actual malice." Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., 260 F.2d at 808. 
As such any privilege which the Defendants might be able to show 
is destroyed by their lack of good faith and their malice and 
ill-will in making the publication. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR TO ORDER A 
DECREE OF REFORMATION SUCH THAT PLAINTIFFS 
MUST CONVEY WATER RIGHTS, WHERE DEFENDANTS 
CLAIM IS UNFOUNDED AND CANNOT BE SUPPORTED 
BY DOCUMENTATION. 
The documentation does not support Defendants' claims 
for water rights against the Plaintiffs. On May 1, 1978, Formen 
Corporation and Parks Enterprises Inc. (consisting of some of the 
Defendants herein) entered into a joint venture agreement a copy 
of which is appended hereto. The joint venture agreement was 
entered into by and among the parties for the purpose of 
developing and selling recreational property known as Elkridge 
Ranches. Contained in section two of that joint venture 
agreement is the provision for water. This portion of the 
agreement Is quoted as follows: 
Formen agrees to provide water rights to the parcels as 
they are sold on a as needed basis and further agrees to 
indeminify and hold Parks harmless from any liabilities 
resulting from the insufficiency of providing such water 
for the tract of parcel thereof. 
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In the event that Forraen defaults under the terras of 
this agreement or in the event this venture shall not be 
completed or terminated short of its time, Formen does 
hereby grant to Parks the right to assume their position 
in the purchase contract with Rennert wherein Parks will 
acquire the water rights by completing the payments of 
the contract, said payments not to exceed the original 
purchase price of $75,000,00. 
In accordance with the terms and provisons of the 
contract as set forth herein above, in the event that the joint 
venture agreement is terminated Parks will have the option to 
purchase the water necessary for their lots. 
Section IX "Termination" of the joint venture agreement 
sets forth the provisions as follows: 
In the event of termination of this agreement all 
liabilities of the joint venture shall be paid and all 
unsold parcels and those held in default of sales 
contract shall be distributed to Parks by the trustee 
holding title to the same. Parks shall have the right 
to acquire the water rights pertaining to said parcels 
at a price equal to Formen1s cost. 
According to this provision Parks was given the rights 
to acquire the water rights by purchasing the same from Formen 
at Formen1s cost on all unsold parcels and those held in default 
at the time of any termination. 
On December 31, 1980, a Memorandum of Partnership 
Dissolution Agreement, appended hereto, was signed by Formen 
Corporation and Parks Enterprises, Inc. terminating their 
contractual relationship and thereby effectuating the provisions 
set forth in the joint venture agreement pertaining to 
termination of the same. It was at the time of termination the 
Parks Enterprises, Inc. was then given the option to purchase the 
water rights by completing the payments of the contract as set 
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forth in the provisions of the joint venture agreement. Parks 
Enterprises has not availed itself to the remedies contained in 
those termination provisions in the joint venture agreement and 
they have not as yet offered to purchase the water rights as set 
forth therein. it has been the Defendants1 position that these 
water rights should be given to them free and clear and without 
consideration. However, there are no contractual obligations for 
the Plaintiffs to convey water rights to the Defendants without 
payment for the same. The Defendants have referred to minutes of 
the meeting which was held on April 28, 1981, between Parks 
Enterprises and Formen Corporation. These minutes have been 
attested to as being an accurate and correct reflection of the 
meeting which took place on that date. The record of the meeting 
does not reflect that the water rights were an issue in that 
meeting and indeed the Defendants testified at the time of trial 
that the water rights were not discussed at the meeting as they 
had been covered in the joint venture agreement. In reviewing 
the exhibits that were submitted at time of trial which reflect 
the meeting held on that date it is clearly shown that the 
understanding by and among the parties thereto was that water 
rights were not an issue at that time as the issue had been 
covered completely and sufficiently in the termination provisions 
of the joint venture agreement. 
At the time of the dissolution of the partnership 
between the parties hereto a special warranty deed was executed 
by the parties and issued to Parks Enterprises conveying to them 
certain parcels of land in Elkridge and in Hideaway Valley. This 
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conveyance was done pursuant to the terms and provisions of the 
Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement and in accordance 
with the termination provisions of the joint venture agreement. 
These deeds are dated May 25, 1982 and Janaury 13, 1981, 
respectively. The Special Warranty Deeds containing the property 
conveyed to Parks Enterprises, Inc., contain only real property 
and are void of any mention of water rights. This was done 
according to the provisions as set forth by and among the parties 
at the time of the dissolution of the agreement and all parties 
at the time conveyance were in agreement that water rights were 
not to be conveyed but were to be handled in accordance with the 
provisions of the joint venture agreement. 
Therefore, the Defendants should be denied their claims 
for the conveyance of water rights without proper consideration 
to wit: payment of the contractual obligations as set forth in 
the termination provisions of the joint venture agreement. The 
documents and deeds signed by the parties hereto accurately 
reflect the intent of the parties in conveying only property to 
the land which is set forth on the respective deeds. The intent 
of the parties was that water would be conveyed upon puchase of 
the same from Plaintiffs by the Defendants. Absent showing of 
intent otherwise the Defendants should be denied their claim for 
the free and clear conveyance of water. 
The foregoing contractual provisions are clear on their 
face and clearly indicate the intent of the parties that there 
would be no water conveyed but rather there would be an agreement 
whereby the Defendants could purchase water at Formen 
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Corporation's cost. That should have been 
the finding of the lower Court and 
in fact the court has no power to remake the contracts for the 
benefit of the party. See 17 Am. Jr. Contracts, Section 242, 
pages 627 & 628 quoted as follows: 
Power of the court to make or change contract for 
parties. 
It is a fundamental principle that a court may not make 
a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract 
under the guise or construction. In other words, the 
interpretation or construction of a contract does not 
include its modification or the creation of a new or 
different one. It must be construed and enforced 
according terms employed, and the court has no right to 
interpret the agreement as meaning something different 
from what the parties intended as expressed by the 
language they saw fit to employ. A court is not at 
liberty to revise, modify or distort any agreement while 
professing to construe it, and has no right to make a 
different contract than that actually entered into by 
the parties. Courts cannot make for the parties better 
or more equitable agreements then they themselves have 
been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts because 
they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the 
parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and 
to the detriment of the other, or, by construction, 
relieve one of the parties from terras which he 
voluntarily consented to or impose on him those which he 
did not. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE CROSSCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS 
BRYCE AVERILL, HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA 
HUFFAKER, THOMAS GENE REID AND MARY REID 
AGAINST FORMEN CORPORATION, FOR A REFUND 
OF MONIES PAID TO FORMEN CORPORATION, 
WHERE SUCH CLAIMS WERE IN VIOLATION OF 
THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, IN IMPROPER 
JURISDICTION FOR THIS COURT TO RULE, AND 
WHERE THERE EXISTS GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
party is entitled to Summary Judgment if, among other things, 
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there is no issue of material fact. This rule was confirmed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Frederick May & Company v. 
Dunn, 368 P.2d 266 (Utah 1962). In this case the Court stated: 
To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence, 
admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most 
favorably to the loser, must show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Such showing 
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could win if given a trial. 
The basis of Foreclosure Defendants1 Fourth Cause of 
Action for Summary Judgment was a simple two (2) sentence 
assumption that Plaintiffs were (1) in violation of federal 
interstate land sale laws and (2) that Defendants1 were 
therefore entitled to a refund of all monies paid to Formen 
Corporation. 
As in exhibit to Defendants memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of motion for summary judgment on cross-
claim of foreclosure Defendants, Defendants included a copy of 
the Interstate Land Sales Act. Section 1420 of the Interstate 
Land Sales Disclosure Act provides that the State Court shall 
have jurisdiction. There is a question of fact therefore as to 
whether the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Sanpete 
County, had the authority to rule upon this motion for summary 
judgment. 
The Defendants memorandum points out the fact that the 
Formen Corporation agreed to allow purchasers who purchased 
prior to April 9, 1982, to rescind their contracts if request 
to do so was made within two years after the date of purchase. 
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Defendants Reids and Averill complied with this 
agreement, requesting contract revision in accordance with the 
two year provision. Defendants Huffakers did not comply with 
this agreement as acknowledged in Defendants memorandum. This 
clearly present a genuine issue of fact upon which the Court 
should rule, denying summary judgment to Cross-Claim 
Defendants Harry Huffaker and Elza Huffaker. 
Upon full examination of Defendants points and the 
Interstate Land Sales Act, it is now Plaintiffs1 position to 
hereby stipulate to an obligation to reimburse Defendants 
Thomas .Gene Reid, Mary Reid, and Bryce Averill, and accordingly, 
Plaintiffs hereby authorize payment to Defendants Reids and 
Averill by and through a release of funds that are in escrow. 
Defendants memorandum raised an additional issue of 
fact in reference to Utah Code Annotated 57-11-17 (as inacted 
1973) which provides that a purchaser is entitled to rescission 
and refund of all monies paid where the developer has made an 
untrue statement. There is clearly an issue of fact as to 
whether developers made an untrue statement. This issue should 
have been tried and not ruled on in a motion for summary 
judgment as to Defendants Huffakers. 
There is a question of fact as to the Courts decision 
allowing rescission under the state act which had a longer 
statute of limitation than the federal act, but under that act 
there had to be the finding of an untrue statement. Under the 
federal act if the Defendants were not delivered a copy of the 
statement within two years they would have the right to 
rescission. 
The disputed facts as to jurisdiction, the statute of 
limitations, the rescission agreement, and the validity of 
Plaintiffs1 statement are issues to be tried rather than ruled 
upon in a motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE AGAINST 
MEL PARKS, AND IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS1 SIXTH 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS WHERE 
THE LOWER COURT BARRED THE PLAINTIFFS FROM 
OBTAINING PERTINENT INFORMATION AND DEVELOPING 
THE CASE IN PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY BY EVIDENTIARY 
RULINGS AT THE TIME OF DEPOSITION BEFORE THE 
COURT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VOLUMINOUS EVIDENCE 
WHICH WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS. 
Defamation when combined with a joint effort to 
effectuate an anti-competitive effort constitutes a violation of 
Utah State Antitrust Laws. 
The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants have violated 
the Utah Antitrust Laws by restraining trade under Utah Code 
Annotated 76-10-914, quoted as follows: 
Illegal anticompetitive activities. (1) Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce is declared to be illegal. 
The foregoing is a criminal statute, but the "Utah 
Antitrust Act" also provides for a civil remedy under the 
foregoing section. That remedy is provided to Plaintiffs under 
Utah Code Annotated 76-10-919(1) as follows: 
Persons and governmental entities may bring action for 
injunctive relief or damages - Treble damages - costs. 
(1) A person, including the state or any of its 
political subdivisions or agencies, who is injured or is 
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threatened with injury in his business or property by a 
violation of this act, may bring an action for 
appropriate injunctive relief and damages and the Court 
shall, subject to the provision of subsection(3), in 
addition to granting any appropriate temporary, 
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, award three 
times the amount of damages sustained, plus the costs of 
suit and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Federal cases under the Federal Antitrust laws should 
be used in interpreting Utah Antitrust laws, Utah Code 
Annotated, 76-10-926, quoted as follows: 
Interpretation of act. The legislature intends that 
the Courts, in construing this Act, will be guided by 
interpretation given by the Federal Courts to 
comparable Federal Antitrust Statutes and by other state 
Courts to comparable state antitrust statutes. 
The comparable federal statutes to Utah Code Annotated 
76-10-914 and 76-10-919 (1) are Section 1 of the Sherman Act and 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 USC Section 15) 
provides as follows: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several states, or with foreign 
nation, is duly declared to be illegal . . . 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 USC Section 14) is as 
follows: 
(a) except as provided in subsection (b), any person 
who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the Antitrust Laws may 
sue therefore in any District Court of the United 
States in the district in which the Defendant resides 
or is found or has an agent, without respect to the 
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, 
including a reasonble attorneys fees . . . 
Therefore, under the foregoing Statute, Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act and Section 4 of the Clayton Act, a federal 
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remedy is provided which is the same as the Utah Code Provisions 
providing for remedies to companies and individuals under 76-10-
914 and 76-10-919 (1). 
Cases interpreting these federal sections are therefore 
governing under the Utah Act by virtue of Utah Code Annotated 76-
10-962. Numerous federal cases have interpreted whether or not 
slanderous statements can constitute antitrust violations when 
aimed by one competitor at another. The prevailing view is that 
this type of conduct does violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
and it would therefore violate the comparable Utah provisions. 
One such case is Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc, vs. National 
Assocation of Independent Sewing Machine Dealers, et al,, a 9th 
circuit case decided in 1958, 260 F,2d 803, 1958 Trade cases, 
paragraph 69, 180 which was decided by the 10th Circuit on Appeal 
from the United States District Court for the District of Utah. 
The Plaintiff sewing machine dealer who was new to the area sued 
the Trade Association for printing an article in its magazine 
claiming: (1) that the article was defamatory; and (2) that the 
article as published was an antitrust violation in that it was an 
attempt to restrain trade. The lower court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants and the Plaintiffs appealed. 
The 10th Circuit before Chief Judge Bratton and Judges Phillips 
and Lewis reversed, stating that the Complaint did set forth a 
cause of action and that the article on its face presented a 
prima facia slander, and introduced sufficient facts to prevent 
summary judgment being granted on the antitrust claim. The 
article is quoted as follows: 
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'You will probably receive a lot of complaints after 
we open up business here1, T. C. Kaplan executive vice 
president, Atlas Sewing Centers, Inc., told Hendrich 
Romeyn, Business Men's Alliance (Better Business Bureau) 
in his Salt Lake City office yesterday. 
Mr. Kaplan called at his office, Mr. Romeyn said to 
try to impress him with the bigness and strength of 
Atlas. 
'He showed me a printed prospectus on the financial 
standing of this corporation he represents. I am a man 
of considerable experience in stocks and bonds, and I 
read the report frora beginning to end several times, but 
I'll be darned if I could find who owned what, ind what 
who owned if they owned it. Many prominent names are 
used, which naturally impressed me, but their actual 
connection is left very vague', Mr. Romeyn said. 
'As to Mr. Kaplan's warning that my office will 
likely receive many calls frora his customers, this of 
course only made me wonder why. If a man calls the 
police department and says he is g'oing to shoot his 
wife, this does not make the crime any less serious 
when it happens. 
'Regardless of all those fancy names and nine-digited 
figures in his prospectus, this office will treat 
complaints against them on their own merits. 
'At this point we have no information, except his own, 
that we may expect trouble, and until we do, we will 
assume that Atlas will, if it opens up here as he says, 
operate under the rules of free enterprise and under 
good business judgment', Mr. Romeyn concluded. 
The general supporting allegations in this case are 
identical to those asserted by the Plaintiff Formen Corporation. 
The Court states at page 805: 
The Association Davies and the other named Defendants' 
through collaboration, cooperation and conspiracy have 
entered into a plan or scheme to unreasonably restrict 
and restrain the business of pursuing and selling sewing 
machines in interstate commerce by a program of 
publishing faults and defamatory information about 
'Atlas and its "products" to induce Atlas' suppliers and 
customers not to deal with it for the unlawful purpose 
of eliminating Atlas' competition in the purchase and 
sale of sewing machines in interstate commerce. 
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The Court found that this allegation properly set forth 
a cause of action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act to the same 
effect as United States vs, Central Code Apron and Linen 
Service, 1952, 1953 Trade Cases, paragraphs 67, 394, Forgett vs. 
Shaff, 1950, 1951 Trade Cases, paragraph 62, 610, Forgett vs. 
Shaff, 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, 1950-1951 Trade Cases, 
paragraph 62,000, 610, 181 F.2d 754. 
The Defendants1 repeated attempts to influence 
governmental agencies and bodies against the Plaintiffs and to 
induce action against them constitute violations of the Utah 
Antitrust Laws. 
The Defendants have made a concerted effort to 
engender complaints to various governmental agencies and have 
succeeded in those efforts in that complaints have been made to 
the following governmental agencies by the Defendants and by 
other parties motivated by the Defendants: 
1. The Sanpete County Commission. 
2. The Sanpete County Attorney's Office. 
3. The Utah State Natural Resource Department, Water 
Resource Divisions and Water Rights Division. 
4. The Federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. 
5. The Utah State Sanitation Department. 
6. The Utah Business Regulations Department. 
Those contacts are supported by the fact statements 
heretofore set forth in this appellant brief. 
Fred Smith has explained in his Affidavit the 
tremendous harrassment that has occurred on the part of the 
-44-
Defendants and has confirmed the fact that he has spent over 
$20,000.00 in legal expenses in meeting those objections. 
The leading case in this area is California Transport 
vs. Trucking Unlimited, (U.S. Supreme Court, 1972) 92 S.Ct. 609, 
404 U.S. 508. 
The summary of this case by the Court at page 642 
provides as follows: 
The Complaint in a civil suit, instituted undar 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California, 
alleged that the Defendant highway carrier had conspired 
to put the planitiff highway carrier out of business as 
competitors by instituting action in state and federal 
proceedings to resist and defeat the plaintiff's 
applications concerning operating rights, and that the 
defendants had combined to deter the plaintiff1s from 
having ffree and unlimited access1 to the agencies and 
courts and to defeat such right by massive concerted and 
purposeful activities of the Complaint for failure to 
state a cause of action (1967 Trade Cases, Section 
72,298), but the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed. (432 F.2d 755)* 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
the Court of Appeals judgment and remanded the case for 
trial. In an opinion by Douglas, J., expressing the 
view of five members of the Court, it was held that: 
(1) although highway carriers, as part of the right of 
petition protected by the First Amendment, had the right 
to access to agencies and courts to be heard on 
applications sought by competitive highway carriers, 
nevertheless they were not necessarily thereby given 
immunity from the antitrust laws and (2) a violation of 
the antitrust laws would be established in the case at 
bar if the plaintiffs' allegations were proved as facts, 
particularly the allegations that the defendants, 
through massive, concerted, and purposeful group 
activites, had combined to deter the plaintiffs from 
having "free and unlimited access" to the agencies and 
courts, it being material whether the means used by the 
defendants might have been unlawful. 
Defendants claim that they had the unrestricted right to 
en mass contact all the governmental agencies which are 
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heretofore enumerated. In Trucking Unlimited, Justice Douglas 
refutes such a notion in the following language at page 647: 
Petitioners rely on our statment in Pennington that 
'nor shields from the Sherman Act a conserted effort to 
influence public officials regardless of intent or 
purpose. 381 U.S., at 670, 14 L Ed. 2d at 636. 
In the present case however, the allegations are not 
that the conspirators sought fto influence public 
officials1 but that they sought to bar their 
competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory 
tribunals and so to usurp the decision making process. 
It is alleged that petitioners 'instituted the 
proceedings with actions . . . with or without probable 
cause, and regardless of the merits of the case1. The 
nature of the views pressed does not of course, 
determine whether First Amendment rights may be 
invoked; but they may bear upon a purpose to deprive the 
competitors of meaningful access of the agencies and 
courts. 
The actions of the Defendants in this case in bombarding 
governmental agencies and trying to influence them to withdraw 
approval from the subdivision, particularly efforts to cause Utah 
County, HUD and the Utah Department of Business Regulations to do 
so, are precisely those kinds of actions which in Trucking 
Unlimited were found to be violative of the Utah Antitrust laws 
as heretofore set forth. 
Mr. Howard argues on behalf of the Defendants that 
they had a constitutional privilege to so approach the 
governmental agencies and that all such communication was in fact 
privileged and any construction of contrary laws would render 
them unconstitutional. Those precise arguments were made by 
Counsel in the Trucking Unlimited case and were promptly rejected 
by the Court at page 648 stating: 
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It is well settled that First Amendments rights are 
not immunized from regulation when they are used as an 
intrical part of conduct which violates a valid 
Statute. Giboney vs. Empire Storage Company, 336 U.S. 
490 93 L Ed., 834, 69 Sup. Ct. 684. In that case 
Missouri enacted a Statute banning secondary boycotts 
and we sustained an injunction against picketing to 
enforce a boycott saying: 
It is true that the agreements and course of conduct 
here were as in most instances brought about through 
speaking or writing but it has never been deemed an 
inbridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a 
course of conduct illegal merely because tVe conduct was 
in part inititated, evidence, or carried out by means of 
language, either spoken, written, or printed . . . 
Such an expansive interpretation of the Constitutional 
guarantees of speech and press would make it partically 
impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in 
restraintive trade as well as many other agreements and 
conspiracies deemed injurious to society. (336 U.S., at 
502, 93 L Ed. at 843.)* 
In Associated Press vs. United States, 326 U.S. 1 , 89 L 
ed.7TffT3", 65 Sup. Ct. 1416, we held that the Associated 
Press was not immune from the antitrust laws by reason 
of the fact that the press is under the shelter of the 
First Amendment. 
In this case the Defendants in their ongoing attempt to 
be over precise may argue that there is a distinction between 
preventing access to a governmental agency and an attempt to 
initiate action through those agencies. That the holding of 
Trucking Unlimited is broader than merely those situations in 
which the Defendant interferes with application is made clear on 
page 648 in the following language of Justice Douglas: 
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible 
practice which may corrupt the administrative or 
judicial process and which may result in antitrust 
violations misrepresentations, condoned in the political 
arena are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory 
process. Apponents before agencies or courts often 
think poorly of the others tactics, motions or defenses 
and may readily call them baseless. One claim which a 
court or agency may think baseless may go unnoticed 
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that a pattern of baseless, repetitive claim may emerge 
which leads the fact finder to conclude that the 
administrative and judicial processes have been abused. 
That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But 
once it is drawn, the case is established that abuse of 
these processes produced an illegal result, effectively 
barring respondents from access to the agencies and 
courts. Insofar as the adminstrative or judicial 
processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot 
acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of 
'political expression.'" 
Trucking Unlimited has spanned a large progeny of cases 
which clearly enforces the notion that a concerted effort by a 
group of individuals to impose upon a competitor through an abuse 
of administrative and/or judicial processes is inappropriate and 
violative of the antitrust laws. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
WHICH WHERE PREJUDICIAL WHERE NUMEROUS 
OBJECTIONS BY DEFENSE COUNSEL WERE SUSTAINED 
AND LIKE OBJECTIONS BY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL 
WERE OVERRULED; WHERE RELEVANT TESTIMONY IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS WAS NOT ALLOWED 
TO BE HEARD; WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS ALLOWED 
TO TESTIFY AS AN ADVOCATE FOR THE DEFENSE 
POSTURE CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CANON 
OF ETHICS; AND WHERE THE VERY NATURE AND NUMBER 
OF THESE RULINGS AND COMMENTARY OF THE COURT 
FAVORED THE DEFENSE, DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND 
PREJUDICIAL COURT RULINGS. 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that the 
judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its 
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) 
create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the 
issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully 
surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to 
anticipate that such evidence would be offered. 
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In the instant case the judge repeatedly excluded 
evidence from testimony but not apparently due to any of the 
three (3) reasons listed above. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43 Evidence (c), 
provides that if an objection to a question propounded to a 
witness is sustained by the Court, an examining attorney may make 
a special offer of what he expects to prove by the answer of the 
witness. The Court upon request shall take and report the 
evidence in full, unless it clearly appears the evidence is not 
admissible on any grounds or that the witness is privileged. 
In the instant case testimony of the Sanpete County 
attorney was not allowed in Court, notwithstanding the proffer of 
testimony by Plaintiffs1 counsel, indicating the relevancy and 
importance of such testimony. Even though it is clear that such 
testimony would contradict the Defense posture, such testimony 
should have, on the grounds called for by Plaintiffs' counsel, 
been allowed in the trial hearing. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide in section (b) for 
the scope of cross-examination such that defense counsel could 
subsequently interrogate-him by leading questions without being 
bound by his testimony and make contradictions and impeach him in 
all respects, and the witness, thus called may be contradicted 
and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party. Wherefore, 
cross-examination upon the subject matter of his examination in 
chief should be adequate descents to any facts or and truth 
obtained through Plaintiffs questioning and subsequent testimony 
for the record. It is essential that revelant testimony be 
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allowed in a Court of law for the purpose of defining and 
illustrating Plaintiffs1 case. 
In the instant case the testimony of Ross Blackham was 
not allowed. Plaintiffs considered Mr. Blackham to be an expert 
witness in this case with testimony relevant and vital to 
Plaintiffs1 case. 
THE COURT: His opinion has not legal weight at all. It 
has no legal weight in this court and it has no legal 
weight -- and it has no more weight than any attorney 
that goes down there or any individual that goes down 
there. (Tr. Vol. II, Page 472,lines 7 through 11). 
Whether or not Mr. Blackham was an expert, his testimony 
in the form of an opinion should have been admissible under Rule 
56: 
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert his 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge 
finds (a) may be rationally based on the perception of 
the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear understanding 
of his testimony or to the determination of the fact in 
issue. 
Clearly Plaintiffs1 sought testimony from Mr. Blackham 
in order to determine important facts in issue. Mr. Summerhays 
explained the relvlancy of proffered testimony as follows: 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: They're claiming or we1re claiming that 
they called us crooks, cheats, and liars and that the 
subdivision was illegally registered . . . (Tr. Vol II, 
Page 469, lines 16 through 18). 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Now, I think, now, I think truth is a 
defense that they're trying to raise and we're trying to 
share the elements of our disparagment. One is that 
they said were illegally registered. That was not 
because we were properly registered and it was improper 
to accuse us of that which would have been a criminal 
violation of the local statute and so I'm just trying to 
get out whether we were properly registered. That's all 
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I'm trying to find out. (Tr. Vol. II., page 469, lines 
24 though Page 470, line 7) 
In spite of the fact that the Defense counsel continued 
to argue the inadmissibility of the testimony and Plaintiffs1 
counsel offered further explanations as to the revelancy of said 
testimony, the Court ultimately found that the admission of this 
testimony was not relevant to Plaintiffs1 case and that the basic 
foundation for questioning was wrong in that, it is not a 
criminal offense being discussed. Mr. Summerhays explained how a 
criminal offense was worthy of consideration as follows: 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: They accuse ray client of a criminal 
offense, they say you committed something that is a 
criminal crime and then they defame him unless they are 
true, unless it's a true statement, so I'm trying to 
find our whether that was a true statement or not, Your 
Honor, and this man is the best man to tell us. Tr. 
Vol. II, Page 474, lines .17 through 22. 
MR. HOWARD: Objection, irrevelant and immaterial, why 
they did or didn't. Tr. Vol. II, Page 479, lines 4 
through 6. 
THE COURT: Objection's sustained. 
Whereupon the witness was excused and Mr. Blackham, who 
was qualified to given an opinion as to the violation of the 
ordinance, was not allowed to testify. That testimony was 
important to show that Formen Corporation had not violated the 
statute in connection with that subdivision. Conversely, the 
testimony of Mr. Don Skipworth, in response to Defense 
questioning airaed at showing said violation was allowed; where at 
Mr. Skipworth, a Formen Corporation officer was not qualified as 
was Mr. Blackham,to testify upon the issued involved. The 
Plaintiffs consequently were not allowed fair representation and 
good faith questioning to define and exemplify their position. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing presentation of facts and law 
Plaintiffs appeal now to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
for a reversal of the lower Court's Judgment awarding Attorneys 
Fees to Defendants* Plaintiffs have spent an abundance of time, 
effort, and money in the belief that they were entitled to relief 
as sought in their pleadings. The proceedings were instituted In 
this matter with good faith, and with the belief that Plaintiffs 
were damaged by the wrongdoings of the Defendants. Plaintiffs 
pursued their claims with diligence and determination in an 
earnest endeavor to recover from loss and to achieve protection 
of the law from any damaging actions that may occur in the 
future. 
The Defendants have not proven their allegation that the 
action was brought in "bad faith11. Upon the preponderance of 
evidence presented for review it is obvious that Plaintiffs1 
claim is supported such that the Defendants have not proven the 
case was "without merit". The Defendants have failed to prove 
that the claims of the Plaintiffs were "of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact". In fact, the claims 
as presented by the Plaintiffs and demonstrated within this 
appellant brief are based on facts presented at the trial by 
numerous witnesses. The Defendants failed to prove that 
Plaintiffs were wrong in initiating and pursuing this litigation. 
Plaintiffs conscientiously sought relief within the provisions of 
the law and in the interest of justice. 
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The State of Utah recognizes the common-law cause of 
action of Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic 
Relations. A prima facia cause of action is made out for that 
tort by showing that the Defendants intentionally interfered with 
the Plaintiffs1 exisiting or prospective economic relations, that 
the Defendants were motivated by an improper purpose or used 
improper means, and that the Plaintiffs suffered an injury as a 
result of the Defendants1 acts. In the present case, there are 
more than sufficient facts for a trier of fact to conclude that 
each of these requirements has been met. Therefore, Defendants1 
Motion to Dismiss this case for the First Cause of Action -
Tortious Interference was inappropriate and should not have been 
granted. 
Utah recognizes the doctrine of slander per se in cases 
such as this one where the Plaintiffs are charged with criminal 
misconduct or conduct not consistent with the operation of a 
lawful business. The Plaintiffs need not show that the 
Defendants intended to defame them in order to recover. Because 
there is evidence on which a trier of fact could base a finding 
of malice on the part of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs may be 
entitled to general and punitive damages as well as proved 
special damages. 
The Defendants claim of right to slander the Plaintiffs 
where the recipient of the defamatory matter is a government 
agency or official is not supported by authority. 
Defense Attorney Jackson Howard said in his opening 
remarks that: 
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• . .Mr. Smith is a peculiar man and we think that 
evidence will demonstrate to show you he's combination 
meglamaniac, paranoid, schizophrenic. He does these 
kinds of things. He gets very, very sensitive. He 
develops an imaginary peak from what he thinks are 
perceived wrongs that others commit and, therefore, he 
gets very, very offended . . . 
(Tr. Vol. I, page 42, lines 9 through 16) 
However, the Defense presentation did not elaborate upon 
or prove the allegations of the above statement, and was in and 
of itself slanderous in nature. 
The doctrine of conditional privilege does not apply in 
this case because the Defendants have no legitimate interest 
which publication of defamatory matter to others would correctly 
or reasonably help them defend or maintain. Even if a 
conditional privilege could be found, it would have been violated 
by the Defendants failure to act in good faLth and without 
malice. 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs have ample grounds on which to 
make a claim for slander and the Defendants" Motion to Dismiss 
this case for the Second through Fourth Causes of Action was 
inappropriate and should not have been granted. 
Plaintiffs hereby appeal to the Utah Supreme Court for a 
reversal of the lower Court's award for reformation such that 
Defendants would be provided water notwithstanding the terms of 
the agreements previously set forth by both parties to this 
action. Defendants have not provided documentation in support of 
their claims for water rights. The contractual provisions are 
clear in the signed agreements which were drawn to set forth 
terms and arrangements whereby water would be available for all 
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parties concerned at any given time by means of the execution of 
the contractual agreements. Plaintiffs are previously obligated 
for the payment of said water rights. The facts and law set 
forth in this appellant brief clearly demonstrate Plaintiffs' 
position in this regard. The intent of the parties of both parts 
was that water would be conveyed upon purchase of the same from 
Plaintiffs by the Defendants. Absent a showing of intent to the 
contrary, the Defendants should not have been granted reformation 
for free and clear conveyance of water. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
seek a reversal of this decision of the lower Court. 
Jurisdiction of the lower Court is questioned in appeal 
to the Supreme Court for a decision as to the lower Court's 
authority to rule upon a motion brought on the merits of an 
agreement with the Federal Office of Interstate Land Sales. 
Concurrently there is a matter of fact as to whether Defendants1 
crossclaims were intitiated in violation of the Statute of 
Limitations. 
Certainly the questions concerning the rescission 
agreement entered into by Formen Corporation and the authenticity 
of Formen1s offering statement are questions of fact and of law 
which should have been heard at trial rather than ruled on in a 
pre-trial motion for summary judgment. 
The Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the lower Court's 
decision to dismiss the cause of action for Antitrust Violations 
on the basis of facts and law rendered within this appellant 
brief. Although Plaintiffs were prevented from conducting 
thorough discovery on the subject due to Court rulings, there is 
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sufficient evidence and appropriate law to warrant a review of 
this issue. The actions of the Defendant did, in fact, restrain 
the trade of the Plaintiff; and the actions of the Defendants 
constituted a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade and commerce of the Plaintiffs, which is in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-914, and which entitled Plaintiffs 
to bring action under 76-10-919 of the Utah Code Annotated for 
damages resulting from the illegal and wrongful actions of the 
Defendants as heretofore set forth. 
It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that a party to 
be affected by a personal judgment must have a day in Court or 
opportunity to be heard (46 Am Jur 2d §18). There was a 
substantial amount of evidence as proffered by Plaintiffs1 
counsel to the Court and as indicated in the substance of the 
expected evidence by questions indicating the desired answers, 
which lines of questioning were repeatedly objected to by Defense 
Counsel and sustained by the Court, such that Plaintiffs were 
unable to enter supportive and factual testimony to the record 
which would verify and substantiate Plaintiffs1 claims. The 
Plaintiffs1 opinion is that the erroneous exclusion of evidence 
in both pretrail discovery and in Court during the trial resulted 
in the exclusion of evidence which would have had significant 
influence in bringing about a different finding. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Leslie W. Slaugh 
and Jackson Howard, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, 120 East 300 
North, Provo, Utah 84603 this 20th day of June 1985. 
ADDENDUM 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit #35 "More Fireworks" Letter and 
"Fireworks" Letters 
Order Awarding Reformation and Attorney Fees 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Judgment 
Joint Venture Agreement 
Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement 
Summary Judgment on Counterclaim on Foreclosure Defendants 
Exhibit "A" to plaintiffs answers- to interrogatories 
HI Folks, 
Tucked away in our fantastic winter wonderland, the snow, like a blanket, has 
made Hideaway Valley, the perfect Christmas card picture* 
Ue have 13 families taking up permanent residence* Giving us about 19 kids* 
School opened the whole last week of August* Hideaway Valley has about 6 kids 
going to Falrview grade school* 7 going to Moroni Middle school, end 6 more attending 
Mt* Pleasant High School* Combined with Indianola, the bus picks up about 56 kids, 
making an all time high for this area* 
U/sfve had two weddings and one new baby since summer* Tom Parks married Robin 
Dove from San Diego, and Itfendy Huffaker married Bruce Catmull from Salt Lake City* 
New baby Matthew belongs to Hal and Shauna Parks* 
Some of the kids from HV spent 3 days this summer on a campout at Doe's Valley 
with the Falrview 3rd Ward* All had a good time* Movies waterskiing, fun games, 
volleyball, and all the food were provided* Awards were given out for 1st, 2nd, & 
3rd place in the competition games* Sunburn was not choosey about who won or lo9t, 
they all got it* Mel Pdrks received the Champion Pancake flipper award, and Myrt 
Parks received thB Chief Cook and Bottle Washer award. 
A few of the ladies of Hidsaway and Indianola area, get together once a month 
to share various Ideas on crafts to make for gifts and home* An abundance of darling 
creations have come out of these sessions* We only wish more women were here to join 
in the fun* 
A few families joined .the Falrview 3rd Ward at their Christmas Formal* Didnft 
recognize some, Boy how we change when we're 8ll dressed up* 
We'd like to acknowledge a special thanks to Don Charlesworth, for making It 
possible" for everyone to get in and out when it snows* Even thof he gets his tractor 
stuck, we appreciate the wear and tear on him and the tractor* We even appreciate 
the noise at 4 in the morning* 
Ue also occasionally see Max Smith On the ever popular gradar clearing the main 
road* Our thanks to him as well* 
Altho the roads ere snowpacked and slick at times, we do try to keep in touch 
with the other families** £\fen if it's just to wave while picking up kids from 
the bus* 
Christmas vacation started Dec 24th, kids are happy, mothers are looking for a 
cheap motel in another town, iJhere we can get some peace and quiet* School starts 
again Dan. 3rd* HOORAY! 
Not much else has happened out here, s^nce winter hit* But we're looking forward 
to Summer when we'll see a lot of you backagaln* Keep in touch* 
Oear Association Member, 
I FIREWORKS I As you have probably surmised after reading the "P.S." addition to 
the Pat Mounteer newsletter, there is not only a lack of concensus among our trustees, 
but feelings have deteriorated to the point that some trustees no lonoer wish to serve 
on the same Board with each other! 
Your Association President end Vice-President feel they haven't accomplished a 
thing while serving with the present Board - that their many trips and meetings have 
beon a complete waste of time and money* But we, as year-round residents of Hideaway 
Valley, have been watching closely the activities of the Board and feel these two 
trustees deserve our thanks and support for seeking after the best welfare of the 
Association and striving to keep Association funds from being spent foolishly* We 
intend to let all the Associetlon members know what has been going on in our next 
Association meeting. (Uait ftll you see the meeting agenda!) 
Property Owners should be interested to know that when your President and Vice-
President called for the Annual meeting to elect new trustees as called for in the 
Association By-Laws, the other 3 trustees protested the motion! 
Never-tho-less, please be advised that our Annual meeting as called for in the By-
Laws (Section 2.1) will bo held on Danuary 27th, 1983 at 7:00 P.M. in the East Cafe-
teria of the Provo High School, 1125 N. University In Provo, Utah, for the express 
purpose of electing new trustees and informing Association members of important 
matters concerning Hideaway Valley. Ue earnestly urge all members to be in attendance 
to vote your preference of how you want your money to be spent and your ideas.concern-
ing amendments to the By-Laws. It is very important that you attend this meeting. 
PLEASE COME! 
NOTE OF INTEREST: Much time, effort, and money has been spent by individual 
members at no cost to tho Association - (everything from the postage costs of this 
newsletter to thB services of en attorney concerning your rights as property owners. 
Sincerely, 
MR. & MRS. DEL TAYLOR MR. * MRS. EVERETT BRITTON MR. & MRS. FRANK PINO 
» GENE REIO » LARRY ANDERSON * BRYCE AVERILL 
•• HAL PARKS • 3ERRY PARKS « KEITH HUFfAKER 
" TOM PARKS STARLA PETERSON 
P.5. Trustoas Mel Parks 4 Don Charlesworth, want you all to know that they believe the 
the Sojrd waa in error in voting to take away the voting right of members with unpaid 
assessments. They believe, as we do, that that is a matter that requires approval of 
tho Association members ourselves. 
WHETHER YOU HAVE PAID YOUR ASSESSBENT OR NOT — YOU WILL HAVE VOTING RIGHTS IN THE 
NEXT ASSOCIATION MEETING THIS DANUARYI 
Exhibit "B" to Plaint i f f ' s Answers to Interrogatories 
* RORE FIREWORKS * 
!C£ THIS ORIGINAL LETTER WAS WRITTEN, THERE HAS BEEN MORE UNDERMINING OF YOUR RIGHTS AS 
IPERTY OWNERS. THIS NOTE I S TO INFORM YOU, THAT REGARDLESS OF ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY 
IEVE TO THE CONTRARY, (TRUSTEES, FREO SMITH, PAT MOUNTEER, & LAMAR MACKLIN,' MAY TRY TO 
ICK THIS MEETING), THERE WILL BE AN ASSOCIATIOfJ MEETING H&D THIS DANURRY
 27TH AS CALLED 
t I N THE ASSOCIATION BY-LAWS FOR THE. EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ELECTING NEW TRUSTEES AND 
'IMG YCU EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INFORMATION OF THE ASSOCIATION. 
I MAY HAVE RECIEVEO A LETTER FROM PAT MOUNTEER, STATING THAT MEL PARKS HAS BEEN RELEASED, 
FEEL YOU SHS'JLD K.\'OW THE TRUTH OF THAT MATEER AND HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERHINE HOW THE 
.OCIATIOrJ I S T 0 ' 9 E RUN AND HOW YOUR MONEY I S TO BE SPENT. 
.ASE DON«T LET US DOWN — CO'lE TO THIS MEETING AND EXERCISE YOUR VOTE AFTER HEARING ALL 
TACTS. <£JU. dUt&UoCft^ $£ (faJjl^* 
DON CHARLE3W0RTH, VICE-PRESIDENT DEL TAYLo/, MEMBER 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, Et al, 
Plaintiffs, O R D E R 
-vs- CIVIL NO. 8579 
MEL PARKS, Et al, 
4 
Defendants. 
The following matters having been taken under advisement, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
WATER ISSUE 
The Court finds it was the purpose of the Dissolution Agreement 
to effect an equal division of the Joint Venture Assets. The water as well 
as the land was an asset and the land could not be legally conveyed to a 
purchaser without water. 
IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT that Parks Enterprises, Inc., 
is entitled to a Decree of Reformation and that Formen Corporation shall 
provide water without cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc., for the lots conveyed 
to it under the Dissolution Agreement. The water to be provided in the 
same proportion as furnished with other lots heretofore sold. 
ATTORNEY FEES ISSUE 
This Court finds the Plaintiffs case was without merit and 
lacking in good faith. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs intended by the law suit 
to take advantage of the Defendants and to hinder and delay the Defendants 
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in their investigation of their rights under the law. 
The Court finds that the use of legal process in this claim 
for millions of dollars and excessive discovery was done to prevent the 
Defendants in their use of property purchased and in the legal process. 
The Court finds that the legal process was used for the purpose 
of frightening the Defendants. Bad faith was exhibited in the filing of 
the Complaint and the causes of action used and in the method of prosecution. 
The Court finds the Plaintiff abused the Court processes, 
namely the Restraining Order, Injunction and excessive Discovery. 
The Court finds the Defendants, at most, undertook to make 
reasonable inquiries concerning their rights as property owners in Joint 
Venture and as subdivision owners. The Plaintiff broughtand maintained this 
action in bad faith to prevent Defendants inquiry and use of the Courts. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE AWARDED JUDGMENT against the Plaintiffs 
for Attorney fees and costs, which the Court finds reasonable, as follows: 
Attorney Fees $30,000.00 
Office Costs - 3,771.05 
Court Costs - 1,800.75 
TOTAL COSTS $35,571.80 
The Defendants shall prepare Findings, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree in conformity with this Order. 
Dated this ^ Q day of October, 1984. 
Re: Formen Corporation -vs- Mel Parks, Et al—Case No. 8579 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Order to the following, 
postage prepaid, thiSo^^day of October, 1984, from offices at Manti, Utah: 
Jackson Howard, Attorney at Law, Offices at 120 East 300 North 
Delphi Building, Provo, Utah, 84603 
Lowell V. Summerhays, Attorney at Law, Offices at 420 
Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101 
Carole B. Mel lor 
Trial Court Executive 
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H O W A R D L E W I S ft P E T E R S E N 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST 3 0 0 NJBTK STREET 
P O Box T78 
PROVO UTAH 84603 
TELEPHONE 373 6345 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a U t a h 
c o r p o r a t i o n , DON SKIPWORTH, 
and FRED SMITH, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
VS. 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a 
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY 
TAYLOR, his wife, LARRY 
ANDERSON, HAL PARKS, JERRY 
PARKS, STARLA PETERSON aka 
STARLA PARKS, BRYCE AVERILL, 
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA 
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS 
GENE REID, MARY REID, his 
wife, WANDA HOPPER, PARKS & 
SONS SANITATION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, PARKS & SONS 
INTERMOUNTAIN, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and JOHN DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. 8579 
The plaintiffs' complaint and the defendants' counterclaims 
came on for trial before the above-entitled Court on August 27 
through 30, 1984. The plaintiffs were present and represented by 
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their attorney, Lowell V. Summerhays. Defendants Mel Parks, Del 
Taylor, Nancy Taylor, Hal Parks, Starla Peterson (now Starla Mayers) 
Bryce Averill, Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza Huffaker, Thomas Gene 
Reid, and Mary Reid (hereinafter "defendants") were each present 
at various times during the trial, and the defendants were repre-
sented by their attorneys, Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slauch. 
The Court having heard the plaintiffs' evidence, and the defendants 
having moved at the close of plaintiffs' evidence to dismiss the 
action for failure to establish a prima facie case, and the Court 
having entertained oral arguments and being fully advised in the 
premises, now hereby makes and enters the following findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties have stipulated and agreed that the counter-
claims of the defendants, with the exception of the third cause of 
action on behalf of Parks Enterprises, and the claim for attorney's 
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, may be dismissed without 
prej udice. 
2. By order of this Court, dated March 27, 1984, this Court 
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to 
(1) the causes of action against Nasky Joint Venture, (2) the 
causes of action against Nancy Taylor, (3) the causes of action 
against Jerry Parks, Starla Parks, and Wanda Hopper, and (4) the 
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cause of action for injunctive relief. 
3. The plaintiffs have stipulated that the fifth cause of 
action, for negligence against Mel Parks, may be dismissed. 
4. None of the defendants intentionally interfered with the 
performance of any existing or potential contracts to which any 
of the plaintiffs were parties. 
5. None of the defendants intentionally interfered with the 
existing or potential economic relations of any of the plaintiffs. 
6. None of the defendants made or uttered any defamatory 
statements concerning any of the plaintiffs. 
7. None of the defendants acted with malice towards any of 
the plaintiffs. 
8. There was no credible or believable evidence that any of 
the statements made by any of the defendants were false. 
9. There was no credible or believable evidence that any of 
the plaintiffs had suffered any special damages proximately caused 
by any of the defendants. 
10. There was no believable, credible and concrete evidence 
concerning any general damages. 
11. The evidence concerning general damages was too specula-
tive to be worthy of consideration. 
12. There was no believable or credible evidence of any 
conspiracy between or among any of the defendants. 
///// 
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13. There was no believable and credible evidence that any of 
the defendants committed any acts violative of the applicable 
anti-trust laws. 
14. It was the intention of the parties to the "Memorandum 
of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" (hereinafter "dissolution 
agreement") to effect an equal division of the joint venture or 
partnership assets. 
15. Formen Corporation had an obligation, as part of its 
contribution to the joint venture, to provide the water necessary 
for the development of the land owned by the joint venture. 
16. The water as well as the land was an asset of the joint 
venture. 
17. The land could not legally be conveyed to a purchaser 
without water. 
18. The failure of the dissolution agreement to explicitly 
list water as an asset and to explicitly provide for the division 
of the water was due to the mutual mistake of the parties. 
19. The parties to the dissolution agreement intended that 
Parks Enterprises, Inc., would receive, as part of its equal share 
of the joint venture assets and without additional or separate cost I 
i 
i 
to Parks Enterprises, Inc., the water necessary for the lots receive* 
i 
by Parks Enterprises, Inc., under the dissolution agreement, and. ' 
that the water would be provided in the same proportion as had been 
///// 
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furnished, or had been contracted to be furnished, for other lots 
heretofore sold. 
20. The plaintiffs* case was without merit and was lacking in 
good faith. 
21. The plaintiffs intended by this lawsuit to take advantage 
of the defendants and to hinder and delay the defendants in 
their investigation of their rights under the law. 
22. The plaintiffs' use of legal process in their claim for 
millions of dollars and in their excessive discovery efforts was dond 
to prevent the defendants from enjoying the use of their property anq 
from their use of the legal process, and constituted harassment. 
23. The plaintiffs used the legal process for the purpose 
of frightening the defendants. Bad faith was exhibited in the 
filing of the complaint and the causes of action alleged and in the 
method of prosecution. 
24. The plaintiffs abused the court processes, in obtaining 
the restraining order and the injunction, and through excessive 
discovery proceedings, and in presenting frivolous and meaningless, 
time consuming evidence and testimony. 
25. The defendants, at most, undertook to make reasonable 
inquiries concerning their rights as property owners in the 
joint venture and as subdivision owners. 
26. The plaintiffs brought and maintained this action in bad 
faith. 
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27. The defendants have incurred attorney's fees in excess 
of $30,000.00, and the sum of $30,000.00 is a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
28. The defendants have incurred attorney office costs in 
the amount of $3,771.05, which amount is reasonable. 
29. The defendants have incurred pre-trial court costs in 
this matter in the sum of $1,800.75. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. None of the plaintiffs established a cause of action 
against any of the defendants for tortious interference with 
existing or prospective economic relations or with existing 
or potential contracts. 
2. Formen Corporation did not establish a cause of action for 
slander or libel against any of the defendants. 
3. Don Skipworth did not establish a cause of action 
for slander or libel against any of the defendants. 
4. Fred Smith did not establish a cause of action for 
slander or libel against any of the defendants. 
5. None of the plaintiffs established a cause of action 
against Mel Parks for negligence. 
6. None of the plaintiffs established a cause of action 
against any of the defendants for anti-trust violations. 
///// 
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7. Parks Enterprises, Inc., is entitled to a decree 
reforming the "Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" 
to include the following paragraph: 
Formen Corporation shall provide water without 
cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc., for the lots 
conveyed to Parks Enterprises, Inc., under this 
agreement. The water is to be provided in the 
same proportion as has been furnished or has 
been contracted to be furnished for other lots 
heretofore sold. 
8. In accordance with the terms of the "Memorandum 
of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" as understood and 
intended by the parties, Formen Corporation should be required 
to convey 69 .acre-feet of domestic use water right to 
Parks Enterprises. 
9. The defendants are entitled to judgment against all 
defendants, jointly and severally, for reasonable attorney's 
fees in the amount of $30,000.00, attorney office costs in the 
amount of $3,771.05, and pre-trial costs in the amount of $3,771.05, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983). 
DATED this day of December, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
DON V. TIBBS, District Judge 
///// 
///// 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this //*- day of 
December, 1984: 
Mr, Lowell B. Summerhays 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SECRE1&RY 
li 
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HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST 3 0 0 NORTH STREET 
P O BOX 778 
PROVO. UTAH 84603 
TELEPHONE 373-6345 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, 
and FRED SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
NASKY JOINT' VENTURE, a 
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY 
TAYLOR, his wife, LARRY 
ANDERSON, HAL PARKS, JERRY 
PARKS, STARLA PETERSON aka 
STARLA PARKS, BRYCE AVERILL, 
HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA 
HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS 
GENE REID, MARY REID, his 
wife, WANDA HOPPER, PARKS & 
SONS SANITATION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, PARKS & SONS 
INTERMOUNTAIN, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and JOHN DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 8579 
The plaintiffs1 complaint and the defendants' counterclaims 
came on for trial before the above-entitled Court on August 27 
through 30, 1984. The plaintiffs were present and represented by 
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their attorney, Lowell V. Summerhays. Defendants Mel Parks, Del 
Taylor, Nancy Taylor, Hal Parks, Starla Peterson (now Starla Mayers) ,| 
Bryce Averill, Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza Huffaker, Thomas Gene 
Reid, and Mary Reid (hereinafter "defendants") were each present at 
various times during the trial, and the defendants were repre-
sented by their attorneys, Jackson Howard and Leslie W. Slaugh. The 
Court having heard the plaintiffs' evidence, and the defendants 
having moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action pursuant to Rule 
41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court having 
entertained arguments, and having previously entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, now hereby makes and enters the 
following judgment: 
1. The defendants are granted judgment, no cause of action, 
against the plaintiffs. 
2. All restraining orders or injunctions previously entered 
in this matter against any of the defendants are vacated. 
3. The counterclaims of the defendants for malicious prosecuticjir 
and defamation are dismissed without prejudice. 
4. Parks Enterprises, Inc., is awarded judgment on its 
counterclaim for reformation against Formen Corporation, and the 
"Memorandum of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" is reformed 
to include the following paragraph: 
///// 
///// 
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Formen Corporation shall provide water without 
cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc., for the lots 
conveyed to Parks Enterprises, Inc., under this 
agreement. The water is to be provided in the 
same proportion as has been furnished or has 
been contracted to be furnished for other lots 
heretofore sold. 
5. In accordance with the provisions of the "Memorandum 
of Partnership Dissolution Agreement" as herein modified, Formen 
Corporation is ordered to convey 69 acre feet of domestic use 
water rights to Parks Enterprises, Inc., within thirty days of 
the date of this judgment. 
6. The defendants are awarded judgment against the plain-
tiffs, jointly and severally, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 
(Supp. 1983), for attorney's fees in the amount of $30,000.00, 
attorney office costs in the amount of $3,771.05, pretrial costs in 
the amount of $1,800.75, and trial costs in the amount of $ 
for a total of $. . 
DAT.B1) this" ' ' f t . jjay of December, 1984. 
I hereby-cej^Jjdf^that a t rue and c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing 
was mailed to the fo l lowing, postage p repa id , t h i s /f^ day of 
/ / / / / 
- 3 -
December, 1984: 
Mr. Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made the / *J day of May, 1978, between 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, having its principal 
place of business in the State of Utah, hereinafter "Formen", 
and PARKS ENTERPRISES INC., an Idaho corporation, having 
its principal office and place of business at 11444 Ustick 
Road, Boise, Ada County, State of Idaho, hereinafter "Parks". 
RECITALS 
1. It is the desire of the parties to develop a tract 
of recreational land situated in Sanpete County, State of 
Utah, which is more particularly described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto. 
2. The parties desire to form a joint venture for the 
development and sale of the recreational tract, according to 
the terms of this Agreement. 
For the reasons herein set forth, and in consideration 
of the mutual covenants contained herein, the parties agree 
as follows: 
SECTION I 
Scope and Description 
The parties hereby create a joint venture for the 
subdivision, development and sale of the recreational tract 
identified as Exhibit "A". The venture shall be conducted 
name of Elk Ridge Ranches and the principal office located 
at Bountiful, Utah. 
SECTION II 
Contributions 
Parks shall expend up to $180,000.00 to acquire the 
said tract of land to be developed, which is described on 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
Formen shall accept full liability and responsibility 
for the development of this tract and shall contribute all 
funds and expert services needed to develop said tract. 
Said funds and expertise to include but not be limited to 
developing a master subdivision plan, obtaining all govern-
mental approvals, engineering, surveying, road construction, 
development, governmental reporting, promotion, zoning, 
inventory control, management of sales and collection of 
sales contracts. Parties agree that time is of the essence of 
this agreement and as a result it is necessary for Formen to 
proceed immediately in an orderly, workmanlike manner to effect 
the development of the project within 2 4 months from the date of 
this agreement. 
In addition, it is understood that Formen has acquired 
the needed water rights required to develop the tract and 
sell the same in subdivided parcels. Parties agree that 
said water is essential to the intent of this Agreement. 
Title to said water, however, is subject to the completion 
of a purchase contract by Formen from the Rennert Investment 
Company, Inc., a Utah corporation. Formen agrees to provide 
water rights to the parcels as they are sold on an "as 
needed" basis and further agrees to indemnify and hold Parks 
harmless from any liabilities resulting from the insufficiency 
of providing such water for the tract or any parcel thereof. 
In the event that Formen defaults under the terms of this 
agreement or in the event this venture shall not be completed 
or terminated short of its time, Formen does hereby grant to 
Parks the right to assume their position in the purchase 
contract with Rennert wherein Parks will acquire the water 
rights by completing the payments of the contract, said 
payments not to exceed the original purchase price of $75,000.00. 
A copy of the purchase contract for water rights between 
Formen as purchaser and Rennert as seller is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B". 
SECTION III 
Conduct of Venture 
Parks shall place $180,000.00 with Backman Abstract & 
Title Company with instructions to apply the same to the 
acquisition of the tract on or before May 3, 1978. Upon 
acquisition, Parks shall have the title conveyed to Backman 
Abstract & Title Company, as Trustee, and Backman Abstract 
& Title Company shall retain title and convey title to each 
lot as it is sold. Conveyance of the title to Backman 
Abstract & Title Company, as Trustee, shall be pursuant to a 
Trust Agreement between the parties to this joint venture 
and Backman Abstract & Title Company. 
It is the parties intent that this Trust Agreement 
provide for an easy administrative method of properly 
transfering title to property when the sales price for the 
same has been fully paid and for the return of title to 
Parks in the event said property is not sold and/or this 
joint venture is terminated as provided herein. 
Due to the nature of the land purchased, seventy-five 
percent (75%) of the cost of such property shall be allocated 
to the Easterly one-half and twenty-five percent (25%) 
allocated to the Westerly one-half. 
Formen shall be responsible for carrying out the develop-
ment and shall first develop and sell the lots constituting, 
approximately, the Easterly one-half of the tract. After 
the completion of the development of the Easterly one-half 
of the tract, the lots constituting approximately the Westerly 
one-half of the project shall be developed and sold. 
Formen shall be responsible for obtaining all necessary 
permits and approvals and for complying with all applicable 
ordinances and statutes. To carry out the work contemplated, 
Formen shall have full authority to order and pay for supplies 
and materials, to negotiate subcontracts for various aspects 
of the work and to assign its own employees to the project. 
Formen shall not, however, allow liens of any kind to be 
attached to the property as a re^ul^pf its development 
activities. The occurrence of sucn a lien, will constitute a h  ie  i  
n 
breach, by Formen, of t h i s Agreement, flmn^n. /)7l{tCi / ^ r £ <&riu A^ 
producing the same, -All sales shall be subject to inventory 
control by Formen. All sales personnel shall be subject to 
and shall abide by all state and federal laws. 
The minimum sales price for each parcel of property 
shall be established by mutual assent of both parties. No 
sale below such mutually established price can be made 
without the written consent of both parties. All questions 
..relating to the sale of more than four (4) subdivided 
IparcelsMto any one purchaser shall be determined by mutual 
agreement of the parties. 
The minimum down payment on any lot acceptable
 vto the 
joint venture shall be five percent (5%) of the lot price. 
However, larger down payments and cash sales will be encouraged 
to facilitate early return of the parties1 investments. No 
contract sale shall exceed ten (10) years of duration nor 
bear an annual interest rate of less than eight percent (8%) 
without the written consent of both parties. 
SECTION VI 
Records 
Formen shall cause to be maintained a complete set of 
records, statements, and accounts concerning the total 
operation of the joint venture, in which shall be entered, 
fully and accurately, each transaction pertaining to the 
venture. Financial statements shall be prepared quarterly. 
All of the books shall be opened at all times for inspection 
and examination by Parks or its agent. 
SECTION VII 
Alienation of Interests 
Neither party may lease, sell, transfer, mortgage, 
pledge, or encumber its interest herein or any assets which 
is a part thereof, without the written consent of the other 
party. Any alienation or encumberance made in violation of 
this provision will not be recognized, will constitute a 
breach of this Agreement and shall operate to terminate the 
Agreement at the option of the remaining party. 
SECTION VIII 
Term 
This Agreement shall continue until all the parcels 
of the tract have been developed and sold or otherwise 
disposed of and the contract relating to the sale of the 
same have been collected or until May 1, 1993, whichever is 
sooner unless terminated by (1) written agreement of the 
parties, (2) an unauthorized alienation of interest, (3) a 
material breach of this Agreement by either party, (4) 
bankruptcy or any other involuntary dissolution of Formen or 
Parks, or (5) a substantial change in ownership and manage-
ment of Formen. 
SECTION IX 
Termination 
In the event of termination of this Agreement, all 
liabilities of the joint venture shall be paid and all 
unsold parcels and those held in default of sales contracts 
shall be distributed to Parks by the trustee holding title 
to the same, Cparks shall have the right to acquire the 
wat^r rights pertaining to the said parcels at a price equal 
to Pormenfs cost. 
If there is not sufficient cash to pay the joint 
venture liabilities, all loans to th§ parties shall be 
called for payment equal to the needs of the venture to pay 
its liabilities. The remaining balance of the assets shall 
be distributed equally to the parties. 
SECTION X 
Compensation 
Except for the payment of sales commissions as provided 
herein, no salary, fees, commissions, or other compensation 
shall be paid by the venture to either party or to its 
officers, agent or employees, for services rendered to the 
venture or in connection with any of its business or property, 
except as may be expressly agreed to in writing by both 
parties. 
SECTION XI 
Agent or Representive 
Each party shall designate in writing a representive 
which shall have the authority to speak in behalf of the 
said party and bind said party in decision required by this 
Agreement. Such designation may be relied on as existing 
and valid unless the same is revoked in writing and the same 
is received by the other party. 
SECTION XII 
Entire Agreement 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between 
the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all other 
agreements, written or oral, made at any time between the 
parties. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused the 
names of their duly authorized officers or agents to be 
signed hereunder. 
FORMEN CORPORATION 
•1 ' ' \ ^" mm' 
J. Fred Smithy President 
PARKS ENTERPIRSES INC. 
By %L S^<7A.^1. kSL M. Hal P a r k s , P r e s i d e n t 
S3Ws ££=. G^VW 
Secretary/ Statla Jean Peterson 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS 
COUNTY OF 
On this M. 
) 
daY o f /"//Vy > 1978, before me the 
, personally appeared J* FRED SMITH, undersigned officer; 
known to me to be the President of the above named Corporation, 
and that he as such officer, being authorized so to do, 
executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein 
set forth, by signing the name of the Corporation by him as 
such officer. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
official seal. 
(SEAL) 
t a r y >££&blic No  &. 
Residing at 
'tfn/~ 
itT/fetfifisrs ^orTk/ 
) S S 
) 
day of 1978, before me the 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF ADA 
On this . 
undersigned officer, personally appeared M. HAL PARKS, 
known to me to be the President of the above named Corporation, 
and that he, as such officer, being authorized so to do, 
executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein 
set forth, by signing the name of the Corporation by him as 
such officer. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
official seal. 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
On this __^__ day of , 1978, before me the 
undersigned officer, personally appeared STARLA JEAN 
PETERSON, known to me to be the Secretary of the above named 
corporation, and that she, as such officer, being authorized so 
to do, executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes there-
in set forth, by signing the name of the corporation by her 
as such officer. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
official seal. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
(SEAL) 
S C H E D U L E A 
The land referred to in this report is situated in the 
County of Sanpete , State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter, the Southeast Quarter, 
and the South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 12 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
The South Half of Section 24, Township 12 South, Range 3 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, 
The North Half, and the Southwest Quarter of Section 25, Township 12 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
The Northeast Quarter, the East Half of the Southeast Quarter, and the 
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 26, Township 12 
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
The South Half of the Southwest Quarter and the South Half of the South-
east Quarter of Section 19, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian."^ 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of the South-
east Quarter of Section 20, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, thence West 60 chains; thence North 20 chains; thence East 
to the West line of the D. & R. G. W. RY. right of way; thence along the 
West line of said right of way in a Southeasterly, Southerly and South-
westerly direction to a point 3 rods North of the South line of said 
Section 20; thence East to a point 3 rods North of the point of beginning; 
thence South 3 rods to the point of beginning. 
Lots 1 and 2 of Section 30, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM any portion of said land which is included in the 
Deed Exception described as follows: 
"The area approximately 40 acres in size containing and surrounding 
Hartney Lake, together with all water rights in and to the waters of said 
lake, and all easements and.rights of way, including expressly a 2 rod 
right of way over the lands hereinabove described for access to and egress 
from said Hartney Lake, all of which were expressly reserved and 
retained by George N. Phelps and H. Clyde Coon, by the terms of an Agreement 
dated March 14, 1969, between George N. Phelps, Barbara Lee Phelps, 
Albert M. Johnson, Frank Lundberg and Duayne T. Johnson, as "Phelps 
Group"., and Capitol Finance Company, as "Capitol" and as granted to 
George N. Phelps pursuant to a Right of Way Agreement executed by Capitol 
Finance Company and dated March 29, 1969. Said Hartney Lake is presumed 
to be located in the Southwest Quarter of-the Northeast Quarter of Section 
23, Township 12 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Meridian." 
EXHIBIT "I 
MEMORANDUM OF 
PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is effective as of the 31st day of 
December, 1980, by and between PARKS ENTERPRISES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, hereinafter referred to as "PARKS"; and 
FORMAN CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, hereinafter referred 
to as "FORMAN." 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto previously entered into a 
Joint Venture Agreement for the subdivision, development and 
sales of a recreational tract of land commonly known as Elk 
Ridge Ranches near Indianola, Utah; and 
WHEREAS., Forman desires to form another joint venture under 
the name "Hideaway Valley" with Parks for the subdivision, 
development and sale of a tract of land commonly known as the 
Morgan Ballard Ranch in Sanpete County, Utah; and 
WHEREAS, a deadlock has arisen between the parties hereto 
as to the duties to be oerformed by the respective parties 
and as to the division and sharing of the profits and losses 
of the proposed Hideaway Valley Joint Venture; and 
WHEREAS, the par Lies hereto now believe it to be m the 
best interest of each of them that their association with 
each other be dissolved, 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties mutually agree as follows: 
1. TERMINATION OF JOINT VENTURE. The joint 
venture between the parties is hereby terminated as of the 
2. DIVISION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES. The assets 
and liabilities of the Elk Ridge Ranches Joint Vienture are 
hereby divided between the parties hereto as set forth on 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof, 
3, TAX CONSEQUENCES. 
3. 1 Pursuant to Tres.. Reg. 1.453-9 (c)(2), 
distribution by a partnership to a partner of installment 
obligations does not result in the recognition of gain or 
loss to either the partnership or the partner unless Internal 
Revenue Code Sections 136 and 751 apply. Said Sections apply 
to uneven distribution of unrealized receivables but do not 
apply to equal distribution of unrealized ^receivables in a 
partnership dissolution. Since the Elk Ridge Ranches operation 
results in a substantive amount of installment obligations and 
since the parties hereto have evenly divided the assets and 
liabilities of said operation, it is anticipated that there 
will be no adverse tax consequences upon this dissolution of 
said operation other than as provided in Internal Revenue Code 
Section 731 to the extent cash received exceeds a partner's 
adjusted basis in such operation before such distribution. 
Any disposition of the assets received by the parties hereto 
in such dissolution may, of course, result in other tax 
consequences depending upon the particular circumstances 
then present. 
3.2 Forman was the managing venturer in said 
or activities will cause dissolution to result in any adverse 
tax consequences not contemplated above or will result in 
any adverse tax consequences not previously reported to the 
appropriate tax authorities for either the Elk Ridge Ranches 
or Hideaway Valley ventures, then all such adverse tax 
consequences will be for all purposes the sole responsibility 
of Forman and Forman shall indemnify and hold Parks harmless 
from any and all such adverse tax consequences and any further 
adverse tax consequences .caused by such adverse tax consequences 
being the sole responsibility of Forman. The phrase "adverse 
tax consequences'1 shall include all taxes, interest and 
penalties imposed. 
4. ENTIRE AGREEMENT. This Agreement contains the 
entire agreement between the parties and modifies and supercedes 
all prior written or oral agreements between them. 
5. BOARD OF DIRECTORS APPROVAL. Each of the 
parties hereto have previously had this Agreement approved 
by their respective Boards of Directors. 
6. FULL DISCLOSURE. Each party hereto has fully 
disclosed to the other all information which would be pertinent 
to such party in making its decision to enter into this Agreement:. 
7. SEVERABILITY. Any provision of this Agreement 
which shall prove to be invalid, void or illegal shall in no 
way affect, impair or invalidate any other provision hereof, 
and the remaining provisions shall, nevertheless, remain in 
8. SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST. This Agreement shall 
be binding upon the successors, assigns, directors, officers 
and shareholders of the parties hereto. 
9. ATTORNEYS' FEES. In the event that a party 
hereto places this Agreement with an attorney for enforcement 
or if suit be instituted for its enforcement, the other party 
agrees to pay, in either case, reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
The parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the 
day and year first above written. 
PARKS ENTERPRISES, INC. 
EXHIBIT "A" 
DIVISION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES. 
USING FAIR MARKET VALUES 
Forman Corporation Parks Enterprises, Inc. 
•t.# Lot # Fair Mkt. Value Acreage Fair Mkt. Value Acreage 
0 1 $ $ 10.200.00 Of ^  
0 2 14,091.71 
0 3 25,074.02 
0 4 10.0 
0 5 3,864.49 
0 6 10,625.00 -p"J 
0 7 6.0 
4 WhB 7,474.55 
2 E^9 9,756.16 
4 W%9 8,535.26 
2 EfjlO 9,003.05 
0 11 13,577.14 
0 .12 6,877.36 
0 13 16,827.40 
3 14 8,903.82 
3 Ni?15 7,946.74 
3 S^15 7,421.76 
) 16 12,254.57 
) 17 11,213.36 
) 18 fcc<.fc>£<-^ -i8,6i5.'oo) 
) 19 14,305.50 
) 5,530.28 
N^21 6,224.43 
1 S%21 13,175.00 
) 22 16,575.00 
) 23 14,370.14 
) 2 4 11,9 9 6.70 
) 25 7,226.57 
) 2 6 lTjJ^ p.OO V-*" 
N^-27 4,431.70 , ^_ 
) S^2 7 8,287.50 ^f^1-^ 
N^2 8 5,144.63 " ~~~" 
1 S^28 12,580.00 
! 29 15,14 8.6 5 
I 3 0 14,908.09 
i 31
 <f 13,668.99 
) 3 2 B*cQ «*{•*_— 14 ,450.00) 
33 19,422.39 
N^34 8,202.50 
~- i 
S^34 9,295.77 i..-o. 
N^3 5 7,88 6.8 4 
S^35 8,223.42 
3 6 14,620.00 
38 17,850.00 
39 16,150.00 
AD 14,0.16.50 
Forman Corporation Parks Enterprises, Inc. 
ct. # Lot # Fair Mkt. Value Acreage Fair Mkt. Value Acreage 
34 
41 
51 
53 
50 
S3 
10 
)0 
'9 
10 
.1 
.3 
!0 
(1 
,3 . 
•1 
0 
1 
3 
0 
0 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
0 
4 
2 
3 
1 
0 
4 
0 
2 
4 
0 
0 
D 
I 
3 
0 
3 
3 
3 
) 
j 
3 
> 
i 
W 43 
N 44 
N 45 
S 45 
N 46 
S 46 
47 
4B 
49 
50 
N 51 
S 51 
52 
N 54 
.S 54 ' 
N 55 
56 
N 57 
S 57 
58 
59 
N 60 
S 60 
N 61 
S 61 
N 62 
63 
W 64 
E 64 
S 65 
N 65 
E 66 
W 66 
67 
E 68 
W 68 
• 69 
70 
7.1 
• N 72 
S 72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
7 7 
N 7 8 
S 78 
E 79 
W 7 9 
5,773.17 
14,727.31 
10,583.88 
17,340.00 
9,217.4 4 
16,799.91 
10,445.19 
8,782.82 
15,709.30 
14 ,9 8?, .87 
7,348.83 
9,200.47 
12,116.08 
18,595.00 
690.76 
638,12 
$ 7 , 1 4 4 . 0 3 
9 , 0 3 2 . 3 8 
8 , 3 3 3 . 8 8 
1 5 , 7 2 5 . 0 0 
1 7 , 0 1 8 . 0 4 
8 , 1 1 6 . 0 9 
8 , 8 5 0 . 2 3 
8 , 1 9 6 . 2 5 
9 , 6 7 2 : 5 7 
1 4 , 6 8 9 . 0 4 
f 
9 , 1 8 0 . 0 0 / Opv~>U-r 
1 0 . 0 
9.8 
1 0 . 1 ' 
5.0 
9.91 
7,724.93 
!*<V>£C *r-
9xl3_2^5JL 0feP-
• 9 , 7 3 5 . 3 6 -
8 ,925.00 °fr*> 
9 , 1 6 0 . 1 6 
9 , 0 7 0 . 7 6 
JL,6 05.0£) 
8 , 9 2 5 . 0 0 
1 0 , 6 9 6 . 0 2 
7 ,862.50 
1 6 , 8 7 3 . 2 4 
9 , 4 4 5 . 4 7 
9 , 2 7 4 . 5 7 
1 7 , 2 4 4 . 8 7 
1 4 , 4 5 0 . 0 0 
1 0 , 2 5 3 . 2 0 
9 , 5 8 8 . 6 1 
7,793.77 
Acct.a Lot 
Forman Corporation Parks Enterprises, Inc 
Fair Mkt. Value Acreage Fair Mkt. Value Acre: 
820 
830 
840 
850 
860 
870 
880 
890 
900 
910 
921 
923 
931 
933 
940 
960 
972 
974 
980 
984 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
• 89 
90 
91 
N 92 
S 92 
N 93 
S 93 
SA 
96 
E 97 
W 97 
E 98 
W 98 
$ 9,334.49 
8,907.85 
13,454.23 
14,113.37 
6,705.00 
15,725.00 
3,465.51 
14,067.50 
7, 708.07 
7,708.87 
15,450.00 
8,660.50 
16,086.51 
12,732.62 
$634,674.30J 
10.0 
42.30 
8,976.60 
10,025.01 
8,800.39 
14,344.71 
19,528.81 
39 
Consists of contracts, lots and sales proceeds from sale of contracts 
Consists of contracts and lots. 
The cash is divided 
equally 
Notes payable 
Customers Deposits 
Total 
$ 56.33 
80.30 
177.54 
Forman 
Corporation 
$ 28.17 
40.15 
88.77 
Ent: 
Parks 
erprises, 
$ 28.16 
4 0.15 
88. 77 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, FOR: 
H O W A R D L E W I S & P E T E R S E N 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST 3 0 0 NORTH STREET 
P O BOX 778 
PROVO UTAH 84603 
TELEPHONE 373-634S 
ijL*£\ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, and 
FRED SMITH, 
Plaintiffs, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
COUNTERCLAIM ON 
FORECLOSURE DEFENDANTS 
VS. 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISE, 
INC./ an Idaho corporation, 
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a parnter-
ship, DEL TAYLOR, NANCY TAYLOR, 
his wife, LARRY ANDERSON, HAL 
PARKS, JERRY PARKS, STARLA 
PETERSON aka STARLA PARKS, BRYCE 
AVERILL, HARRY KEITH HUFFAKER, 
ELZA HUFFAKER, his wife, THOMAS 
GENE REID, MARY REID, his wife, 
WANDA HOPPER, PARKS & SONS 
SANITATION, INC./ a Utah corpora-
tion, PARKS & SONS INTERMOUNTAIN, 
INC./ an Idaho Corporation/ and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
TtL-^=-1_. . »£_;_ 
The defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment on [Counterclaim] 
of Foreclosure Defendants/" filed on behalf of defendants Bryce 
Averill, Harry Keith Huffaker, Elza Huffaker, Thomas Gene Reid, and 
Mar Reid, came on before the above entitled Court for hearing on 
Civil No. 8579 
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the 21st day of December/ 1983/. The moving defendants were not 
present/ but were represented by their attorneys/ Jackson Howard 
and Leslie W. Slaugh. J. Fred Smith/ president of the Foremen Corp-
oration/ was present and Formen Corporation was represented by its 
attorney/ Lowell V. Summerhays. The Court having heard arguments/ 
and having reviewed the memoranda submitted by both parties, and 
having determined that there is no dispute as to any material issue 
of fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law/ now hereby makes and enters the following judgment: 
1. Bryce Averill is awarded judgment against Formen Corpora-
tion in the sum of $2/549.00/ together with prejudgment interest in 
the amount of $612.68/ for a total of $3,161.68. 
2. Thomas Gene Reid and Mary Gene Reid are granted judgment 
against Formen Corporation in the sum of ff, fr^Wi .-T^ , together with 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $496.70/ for a total of 
$2,582.45. 
3. Harry Keith Huffaker and Elza Huffaker are granted judg-
ment against Formen Corporation in the sum of $3,022.36, together 
with prejudgment interest in the amount of $759.78, for a total of 
$3,782.14. 
4. Interest shall accrue on these judgments at the rate of 
12% per annum from the date of entry. 
///// 
///// 
- f73H — 
< 
-I 
St 
0 u) 
3 Z 
Is 
. < 
n UJ 
u o 
1 CM 
c -
5 
en £ 
0 < 
00 t w 
3
 z 
fl. > 0. 
0 |" 
? " 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
DATED thiaaaSjX' I!C&VA 
:63 
fcJftG CERTIFICATE 
I hereby cW&gjjj^j^'t I mailed a copy of the foregoing Summary 
Judgment on Counterclaim on Foreclosure Defendants to Lowell V. 
Summerhays/ 420 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, postage prepaid, this /£*^ day of xju-^ , 1984. 
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